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Abstract
Empirical and theoretical topics in applied microeconomics are discussed in this dissertation. The ﬁrst
essay identiﬁes and measures managerial advantages from access to high-quality deals in venture capital
investments. The underlying social network of Harvard Business School MBA venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs is used to proxy availability of deal access. Random section assignment of HBS MBA
graduates provides a key exogenous variation for identiﬁcation. Being socially connected to peer venture
capital ﬁrms and private equity seeking startups leads to more deal ﬂow, larger asset under management
and better performance in the inaugural funds of HBS-executive run venture capital ﬁrms. The second
essay presents a two-stage model of competing ad auctions. Search engines attract users via Cournot-style
competition. Meanwhile, each advertiser must pay a participation cost to use each ad platform. Advertiser
entry strategies using symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium that lead to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves outcome
of the ad auctions are derived. Consistent with the model predictions, empirical evidence shows that
multi-homing advertisers are larger than single-homing advertisers. Comparative statics on consumer
choice parameters, quality, and user welfare are used to analyze the prospect of joining auctions to mitigate
participation costs. The analysis provides conditions when such joins do and do not increase welfare.
The third essay develops and computes a dynamic model of search in internet advertising. Micro-level
browsing data from Microsoft’s Bing.com (formerly known as Live.com) is used for structural estimations.
The model predicts that users do not click on any ad with weak signals due to accumulating search cost
and monotonicity of the value function. Rational search reveals a cascading pattern: the user clicks on
a sufﬁciently high, highest-signal ad ﬁrst, then moves on to the ad with the next highest conditionally
expected probability of match once his assessment on the current ad degrades over time. The user exits
when maximum assessment of likelihood of match over all ads is below a threshold value. The essay
provides a novel approach to understanding rational herding behavior when product quality is only
partially unraveled.
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Value Access in Venture Capital1
1.1 Introduction
What makes venture capital successful? Determinants of venture capital performance is of particular
interest in ﬁnancial economics because private equity (including venture capital) is known to be a unique
asset class in which market outperformance persists up to three consecutive funds ([26]). Unlike public
equities that transact on exchanges, venture capital is a complex two-sided matching problem between
entrepreneur and venture capitalist. A critical aspect of matching markets is the relative supply of (and
demand for) each side of the matching transaction. While there is anecdotal evidence on the importance of
access to ex-ante high-NPV entrepreneurs to explain much of cross-sectional variations in venture capitalists’
performance, there is no good empirical evidence. I test the hypothesis that the well-connected venture
capitalist may be successful by attaining access to great deals.
There are two signiﬁcant empirical challenges. A measure for availability of access to deals which is a
latent variable, is difﬁcult to design. Second, endogenous managerial success must be disentangled properly,
since access to great deals may be a direct function of superior talent. I address the ﬁrst challenge by using
social connections as proxy for availability of access. Social connections are instrumental in providing
access to deals in an environment with limited investment opportunity and information asymmetry.2 3
1Job-market paper
2I use access limitation to refer to cost of search, which can be prohibitively high, even if there are many more small businesses.
In terms of raw supply, there were 5,294,970 businesses with less than 20 employees in 2008 (US Census Bureau).
3It may be argued that even in public equity markets, managers with different information advantage (insider information) are
able to view a meaningful subset of opportunity set. However, I distinguish between access and evaluation of investments. If private
1In particular, investors of public market equities all have access to every stock listed on a public index.
Whereas in private markets, no such listings exist. Moreover, information asymmetry is a major hurdle in
private markets due to non-mandatory disclosure of company statements, and especially in early-stage
investments with non-existent track-records of business performance. Hence access to deals are often
gained through syndications, or groups of co-investors, formed within trusted social contacts to diversify
information signals.
To address the second obstacle, I employ HBS random section assignment to provide the necessary
exogenous variation in social connections. The administrators of HBS use carefully surveyed proﬁle of each
student to assure a uniform distribution of various characteristics ([28]). I identify shares of section peers
of an HBS executive who are venture capitalists and entrepreneurs as measures for availability of indirect
and direct access to deals, respectively.
In the ﬁrst set of results, I consider a limited sample of inaugural funds raised between 1980 and 2011
by US-based venture capital partnerships so that the effects are free from selection on observable past
track-records. Also, if past track-record is a substitute for the beneﬁts of social capital, its potential premium
on various determinants of fund success will be presumably the strongest in the early stage of the ﬁrm ([6]).
In the baseline speciﬁcation, I test to see if the share of peers is positively correlated with the number
of syndication partners. If VC ﬁrms tend to syndicate with socially connected peers then the regression
coefﬁcient on the share should be positive and signiﬁcant. Moreover, I restrict the deﬁnition of syndication
partners in two ways following [22] for measures of direct and indirect access. First is a syndication partner
who was invited into a round by the VC ﬁrm acting as a lead investor (outdegree); and second is a
syndication partner who is the lead investor and invited the VC ﬁrm into a round (indegree). I show that a
ﬁrm’s outdegree is positively correlated with the share of section-peer entrepreneurs (EPs) and a ﬁrm’s
indegree is positively correlated with the share of section-peer venture capitalists.
To estimate economic implications, I compute the effect of knowing peers on the size of inaugural
funds. The estimates translate to $56.32M per company headed by a peer entrepreneur and $33.79M per
peer VC-ﬁrm unconditionally, or $21.09M and $7.43M, given the average size of HBS funds of $100M. In
order to test the idea that fund partners are able to raise larger funds by advertising their social-ties to
limited partners, I run an OLS speciﬁcation with a proxy for maturity of social contacts. I interact share
of section/class-peer VCs/EPs with the age of HBS partners (difference between the average graduating
class years of all partners in an HBS ﬁrm and the vintageyear of its inaugural fund). Results show that all
equity investors retain any information advantage beyond exclusive access, this would yield further heterogeneity in outcomes.
2coefﬁcient estimates on share of peers in VC and entrepreneurship are positive and signiﬁcant, supporting
the idea of raising larger funds by advertising established contacts.
Next, I examine investment performance to understand the effects of social connections on deal outcome.
I show that the performance of section-peer funds on deals done prior to the inaugural fund’s vintage year,
has a positive effect on fund performance. Results show that one standard deviation higher section-peer
performance leads to 6.3% higher likelihood of IPO to 20.79% from its baseline performance of 14.49% in
the absence of peer activity, on deals exposed by HBS-ﬁrms through their inaugural funds. In economic
terms, one standard deviation higher section-peer performance in the previous period leads to an estimated
22.16% increase in inaugural fund size, or $28.48M.
Lastly, I test three candidate hypotheses to better understand the mechanism underlying performance
premium associated with either syndicating or ﬁnancing a section peer. One possible explanation of the
effect of social interactions on managerial success is ability screening. Suppose peers learn through the
course of two years in HBS the underlying abilities of each section mate. By selection, each section will
discriminate high and low talent managers in decisions to syndicate (VC-to-VC) or ﬁnance (VC-to-EP).
Then a deal syndicated between non-section peers will be a match between low talent managers, possibly
yielding the results in which likelihood to IPO is systematically higher by decreasing social distance.
Additionally, if ability screening is the primary function of peer interaction during the MBA years, one
should expect to observe section exclusivity to weaken and eventually disappear in the follow-on funds as
market participants will be able to condition on observable past track-records. Regression results however
suggest that section exclusivity and the associated marginal effect on likelihood to IPO remain robust to
inclusion of all follow-on funds as of 2011.
Second explanation is that social-ties reduce cost of search and coordination such that the production
function is enhanced among peers. Third hypothesis is that the most connected VCs receive privileged deal
ﬂow. Distinguishing between the two possibilities is difﬁcult when using the share of portfolio companies
that eventually go public as a performance measure. Production function improvement idea would suggest
that conditional on accessing a deal, venture capitalists add value beyond providing access to capital
through advice and other resources by working more harmoniously with peers. The access idea would
suggest that best friends offer access to the best deals, and that investing into high-quality entrepreneurs
drives the results of high IPO exit rates.
Using the average number of startups founded (unconditional on exit status) by c-level executives and
founders of portfolio companies prior to the ﬁrst investment round a la [17], I control for ex-ante deal
3quality. I regress deal quality on VC-to-EP ﬁnancing matches and VC-to-VC syndications. Results show
a systematically increasing positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimates with respect to social proximity
in connections. This suggests that peers endow venture capitalists with access to better deals. Peer VCs
may be able to sustain a stronger dynamic relationship that forms a proprietary deal ﬂow. Indeed, I ﬁnd
evidence that leading investment rounds is associated with being invited to future rounds. 4
Then I examine deal outcomes at the individual round-level, in order to distinguish between peer
syndications formed simultaneously in a single round, and syndications formed across a sequence of
rounds. Syndications of the latter form render an early investor who is presumably the leader providing
access to the later investor. If the production function enhancement hypothesis is correct, then both forms
of syndication should be positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with deal success. Results however show
that simultaneously formed peer syndications are not signiﬁcantly correlated. Rather, estimates indicate
that following an early section- or class-peer investor is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with deal
success. Using this evidence, I conclude that deal access hypothesis is more likely true.
Lastly, in order to measure the persistence of the effects detected in inaugural funds, I consider an
inclusive panel data set of all 3,799 funds raised between 1980 and 2007, and measure deal ﬂow and
performance across 10-year lifecycles. When considering follow-on funds, market participants are able to
condition on observable track-record of managers, hence the previous exercise of using the raw number
of peer ﬁrms will fail to identify the effect in question. To address this, I use data on peers working in
the same sector as the fund’s focus but in non-investment roles varied by residential proximity to tease
out effects of social connections on deal ﬂow. Results show that those targetting Computer Software &
Internet receive positive and signiﬁcantly related deal invitations, whenever the ﬁrm is surrounded by
non-investing peers in the same state.
This research provides insight on deal ﬂow, syndications and performance as functions of the under-
lying peer network in venture capital. Random section assignment of HBS MBA venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs is used to identify and measure the economic value of social connections. Results suggest
that the well-connected venture capitalist may be successful by attaining access to great deals. The effect is
identiﬁed in key aspects of the inaugural fund, and appears to be persistent in the follow-on funds.
The paper is organized as follows: section II provides literature review. Section III elaborates on
the econometric model used for measurement. Section IV describes the data set and provides summary
4[27] show that the business product is more correlated with success than the quality of management. However, since the
underlying idea associated with the business product is a transportable good, the original founder of the company may remain as the
primary source of success.
4statistics. Section V gives results, section VI provides extensions and section VII concludes. All tables and
ﬁgures are available in the appendix.
1.2 Literature Review
[22] examine venture capitalists’ underlying investment syndication network structure to show that
there is strong positive correlation between performance and a variety of measures of the VC’s network-
connectedness. Authors ﬁnd that VC networks, formed through past and on-going syndication partnerships,
add value to investment success rather than provide privileged access to good deals. In my paper, I use
networks formed through the years executives spent at Harvard Business School and suggest that HBS
alumni beneﬁt by accessing the best deals.
Several papers have attempted to use and test social-ties as a booster of performance. In each instance,
authors have used same-degree holding as a link in either syndications or entrepreneur-ﬁnancing matches.
However, within-school heterogeneity and selective sampling of visible venture data pose signiﬁcant
hurdles to establishing proper identiﬁcation. Moreover, the question of how social connections can achieve
strong performance is not addressed in the analysis, whereas I posit that access available through social
ties to ex-ante high-NPV entrepreneurs drives success.
[6] shows that general partners holding the same school degrees tend to syndicate more often and the
associated IPO exit rates tend to be higher. Two major challenges in the paper are establishing identiﬁcation
given the same school degree measure, and addressing selection bias in surviving funds and startups
observed in the sample. Measuring social-tie as a pair holding the same school degree does not rule
out unobserved heterogeneity (across class and within class shocks) that may prevent establishment of
a causal link.5 Notably, managerial ability is difﬁcult to control for the econometrician but most likely
is the key confounding factor of the effect in question. Suppose some latent data regarding a manager
is observable to other investment partners (managerial philosophy, past employment history, knowledge
of the industry, etc) but unobservable to the econometrician and weakly correlated with any observable
characteristics (school attended).6 Then a selective subsampling of data - dropping Harvard/Stanford
or top 5 schools - for robustness checks will be insufﬁcient in ruling out ability-driven results. Author
5As part of a robustness check, author uses same school, same degree and similar age (within 4 +/- years for undergraduate and
6 +/- years for graduate degree ties).
6Although [18] reveal that holding a top business school degree or top college degree is positively correlated with likelihood to
IPO, academic degree may remain as a noisy measure of ability.
5presents evidence that school-tie premium diminishes after the ﬁrst syndication relationship arguing
against the talent hypothesis; but the change in effect may be driven by substituting either access to
good deals or reduction in coordination cost with a proven track-record, encouraging former syndicating
partners to become independent thereby improving the quality of unconnected syndications.7 The value of
establishing a strong track-record will be especially important for the sample of same-school, ﬁrst-time
syndications as such VC partnerships will constitute inaugural funds. Moreover, if same school matching is
a result of ability-based screening, the measure of school connections will be more precise than dividing
Harvard/Stanford and the rest, or top-5 and the rest, as alternative ability measures considered by the
author in robustness checks.
Second, publicly available venture capital data is subject to sample selection. Both failed VC-backed
companies and poorly performing funds will not be visible in the data. In contrast to the previous
challenge of identiﬁcation, if ability is actually correlated with the ranking of school attended by managers,
lower-ranked schools will be over-represented by high-ability managers from such schools in the observed
data, yielding an upward-biased measurement of school-tie effects. In my paper, I address both challenges
of controlling for managerial ability and sample selection using balanced section assignment. Balanced
section implies that talent is balanced across sections, hence the distribution of section graduates will be
uncorrelated with ability and remain unchanged in the observable sample of surviving funds. Also, author
focuses only on VC-to-VC syndication ties but in this paper, I also consider VC-to-EP ﬁnancing ties.
[18] show VC-VC syndications with top-school degrees perform better on average. But syndications
formed based on same ethnic backgrounds, same school (top or not), or worked for the same previous
employer, which is a different measure of social connection (afﬁnity links), tend to perform worse.
[36] considers both VC-to-VC syndications and VC-to-EP ﬁnancing ties as well, similarly in attempt to
measure the effect of social-ties on syndication propensity and performance. The measure of social-tie is
limited to same-school degrees, and in this case, without distinguishing undergraduate or graduate degree
or class year. In particular, the institution producing the most number of entrepreneurs and the third highest
number of VCs is University of California (i.e. Berkeley, UCLA, UCSD and all other seven campuses are
clustered as one unique institution). Hence in one extreme, a VC who received his undergraduate degree
from UC-San Diego from class of 1980 investing into a startup run by an MBA-graduate of UC-Berkeley
from class of 2003 will be presumed to be socially-tied in the same sense as a pair of class-peers from MIT.
7As an example, an inexperienced Stanford (Harvard) manager may begin by syndicating with another Stanford (Harvard)
manager, successfully exit deals, then subsequently syndicate with a Harvard (Stanford) manager.
6In addressing the concerns of sample selection bias, author follows a [20] two-stage selection model. Joint
distribution of companies and funds across states is used as an instrument in the ﬁrst stage following [7].
However in BDH, locational heterogeneity across different countries in Europe as a source of exogenous
variation in company-investor match process is used. An adaptation of such method in the US across states
will be problematic as funds are often endogenously agglomerated near San Francisco, California and
Boston, Massachusetts.
In consideration of differences and commonalities in the previous works, one can notice a trade-off
between establishing a well-deﬁned measure for social-tie and the available breadth of data cross-section to
support a meaningful estimate. While [36] provides an ambiguous measure of social-tie, author examines
board-level connections among venture capitalists. [6] and I aggregate partners over the ﬁrm-level while
providing improved measure of social-ties. Firm-level measures allow the possibility of falsely viewing a
relationship link between Stanford partners as a link between HBS partners in a ﬁrm dominated by Stanford
alumni. However, such upward bias in estimates do not exist between entrepreneur and VC connections
since the number of CEO/founder in startups are limited to a few. Also, differential marginal effect on deal
success when varying social proximity among VC-to-VC connections suggest that non-HBS link bias in
estimates are unlikely driving the results.
[5] and [21] also study VC-to-EP ﬁnancing process but ask different questions. [35] formulates a
structural two-sided matching model of VCs and EPs but focuses on different questions.
[10] show similar results among mutual fund managers. Managers holding stocks of companies
with CEOs or board members from the same school retain a performance premium, presumably due to
information diffusion. My work resembles the result and methods employed in CFM but I apply the
hypothesis to venture capital and also consider VC-to-VC syndications.
The proposed identiﬁcation technique of using HBS random section assignment is not new but it is a
novel application on answering a unique question, in the context of venture capital. [28] use a sub-sample
of the same section data to show that graduates are more likely to pursue entrepreneurship if more students
with previous entrepreneurial experience are present in the same section. [34] performs a similar exercise
to show that executive compensation is inﬂuenced by peer effects. To address section-level common
shocks, Shue employs cyclical reunions as a source of exogenous variation. I apply the data to identify and
measure the effect of social connectedness on deal ﬂow, fund size and performance in venture capital; and
use ex-ante characteristics of section mates as instrumental variables to control for potential section-level
common shocks.
71.3 Econometric Model
I now lead the discourse onto the particular empirical methodology that employs random section assignment
to measure effects on inaugural funds raised by HBS executives for identiﬁcation. A restricted sample of
inaugural funds are used for two reasons: many factors that are inﬂuenced by observable measures of VC
ability (number of syndication partners, access to quality of deals, sectoral targeting, fund size, etc) are
normalized given the absence of observable fund track-records. Second, if past track-record is a substitute
for the beneﬁts of social capital, its potential premium on various determinants of fund success will be
presumably the strongest in the early stage of the ﬁrm.
I specify two baseline models.
Dn = aXn + gPeerTie + sn + kt + en (1.1)
In the ﬁrst version, each observation is at the unique deal-level. Dn is equal to 1 if the company
eventually exits via IPO as of December 2011, and 0, otherwise. Xn includes deal-level vector of observabable
characteristics (average number of co-investors per round, types of co-investors, average fund size, etc)
and PeerTie is an indicator variable equal to 1 if there exists at least a pair of co-investors (or a co-investor
and company executive pair) that are socially connected. The closest form of social connection is between
section-peers, next is between class-peers, then between school-peers. I am interested in the coefﬁcient
estimate ˆ g under various speciﬁcations.
In the second version, each observation is at the unique fund-level. It is deﬁned as follows:
Yit = a0Xit + b0Vit + g0sit + ui + kt + e0it (1.2)
Yit is the dependent variable of interest describing some dimension (number of unique syndicating
partners, size of the inaugural fund, etc) of ﬁrm i at year t. Xit is the ﬁrm-level vector of observable
characteristics including graduation year ﬁxed effect, Vit include industry-wide observable components, sit
is the number of section-peer GP ﬁrms (normalized by section or class size) of ﬁrm i active in year t. ui and
kt are ﬁrm and year ﬁxed effects. I would reject the null hypothesis that section-peer ﬁrms do not inﬂuence
outcome measures of ﬁrm i if g is statistically different from zero. The extent to which peers actually
inﬂuence the investment strategies of fund managers may go beyond syndications, deal access or ability
to raise funds. Peers may inﬂuence an investment banker to pursue venture capital, or target a particular
sector. As such, estimations of particular effects of social connections that operate through syndications
8and direct ﬁnancing in venture capital represent an underestimation of the broader peer inﬂuence.
It should also be noted that there is a signiﬁcant gap in number of years between the dependent
variables and the explanatory factors that proxy social interactions from MBA years. Firm ﬁxed effect ui is
included to control for interim-period idiosyncratic shocks. Section-level common shocks are addressed in
the following.
Suppose the HBS executives in ﬁrm i from class of 1998 section C formulated similar projections
regarding internet and software industries that induced several section-mates to pursue venture capital
upon attending lectures by a famed professor. This would represent some latent shock zit in the error
term such that E[e0itsit] 6= 0. A section-level common shock during the MBA years can bias the estimate in
question, or worse, yield spurious results in the absence of any causal peer factors.
I approach this problem by using ex-ante observable characteristics of section-peers as instruments and
estimate g using second-stage least squares (2SLS). Consider the following ﬁrst-stage speciﬁcation:
sit = a1Xit + b1Vit + dwi + ui + kt + e1it (1.3)
wi is a vector of two key instrumental variables for sit. The ﬁrst is mean share of U.S. News & World
Report top-10 colleges8 attended by the section-peers of all HBS executives of ﬁrm i.9 The second is
mean share of males among section-peers of all HBS executives of ﬁrm i. The ﬁrst measure is strongly
correlated with the number of section-peer ﬁrms as all schools in the top-10 with the exception of Columbia,
University of Chicago and Caltech also represent the top suppliers of HBS venture capitalists. The second
measure will also yield strong correlation as males constitute the majority of HBS VC executives (72%). No
intermediate shocks during the MBA years have effected them, because both measure ex-ante characteristics
of section-peers. Moreover, since HBS administrators actively balance the sections conditional on observable
characteristics of an incoming class (i.e. undergraduate institution attended and gender) in attempts to
ensure equitable experience across sections for each individual, such factors are unlikely to cause any
particular shocks during the MBA years or to be systematically correlated with an individual characteristic.
In the second stage, I use the following speciﬁcation:
8Top 10 national universities according to U.S. News and World Report as of September 2012 are: Harvard, Princeton, Yale,
Columbia, Chicago, MIT, Stanford, Duke, Pennsylvania and Caltech.
9As a robustness check to rule out possible sub-section treatment effect (top school attendees form exclusive investment clubs
within section), I tested a speciﬁcation that includes covariates for whether or not any of the HBS executives in the ﬁrm attended a top
institution or is male. Estimates remained unchanged.
9Yit = a2Xit + b2Vit + g2ˆ sit + ui + kt + e2it (1.4)
where ˆ sit denotes the ﬁtted values from the ﬁrst-stage equation (1.3). If all required assumptions of the
estimation steps are fully met, a statistically signiﬁcant non-zero coefﬁcient estimate of g2 will allow one to
reject the null hypothesis that section-peers do not inﬂuence outcome measures of ﬁrms.
1.3.1 Firm-level Aggregation
When aggregating individuals over the ﬁrm, there are potentially two issues of concern. First, ﬁrm-level
measures allow the possibility of falsely viewing a relationship link between Stanford partners as a link
between HBS partners in a ﬁrm dominated by Stanford alumni.10 To address this, I show differential
marginal effect on deal success when varying social proximity among VC to VC connections. Observing a
change in syndication coefﬁcient estimate with respect to change in social proximity controlling for the
number of HBS execs in the ﬁrm (hence also the ﬁrm’s number of all partners), I am able to rule out
spurious non-HBS connection as a driving effect. Second, if an HBS ﬁrm has more than one HBS alumnus
from a different class, I need to be careful in assuring that the exclusion restriction is not violated when
using instrumental variables for 2SLS estimations.
An HBS venture capital ﬁrm (ﬁrm with at least one HBS executive) on average has 3.60 alumni over
the course of its life. Of the ﬁrms with at least two executives, 31% general partnerships include at least
one pair from different classes. I examine the consequence of ﬁrm-level aggregation on the key operating
assumption of balanced sections that ultimately provide the necessary exogeneous variation to correctly
identify g2.
Suppose the ﬁrst- and second-stage ﬁrm-level outcome equations can be disaggregated to the following
pair of individual equations:
sjt = ˜ a1Xjt + ˜ b1Vjt + ˜ dzj + uj + kt + e1jt (1.5)
Yjt = ˜ a2Xjt + ˜ b2Vjt + ˜ gsjt + uj + kt + e2jt (1.6)
where j indexes each individual HBS executive in ﬁrm i and zj denotes a section-level instrumental
variable.
10However, such bias in estimates is unlikely to exist between entrepreneur and VC connections since the number of CEO/founder
in startups is limited to a few.
10Then by aggregating over each individual j in ﬁrm i, I get the following second-stage ﬁrm-level outcome
equation:
Yit = a2Xit + b2Vit + ˜ gSsjt + ui + kt + Se2jt (1.7)
where by construction, exogenous covariates aggregated over individuals equal the ﬁrm-level exogenous
covariates.
We know that E[zje2jt] = 0 by balanced section, however it remains to be shown that E[zje2j0t] = 0 for j 6=
j0 in order to apply the ﬁrm-level wi as proper instrumental variable in the aggregated equation. Intuitively,
the correlation requirement stipulates that percentage of top undergraduate institutions attended by students
from different sections (both within and across classes) is not correlated with any unobservable characteristic
of an HBS executive. I need to rule out that some high (or low) percentage of top undergraduate institutions
represented in an older class, 1: did not affect some unobservable section/class-speciﬁc shock included in
the error e2j0t and 2: did not cause a particular type of future students to sort themselves and apply to HBS.
Figure 1.1: Percent of section attending top VC/EP-producing schools for classes 1970 - 2008 1020304050% of Section Attending Top School250300350400450500 Section Index (Classes 1980-2008)
Figure displays percent of students in each section attending one of 10 schools in the list: 
Harvard, Princeton, Yale, Columbia, University of Chicago,
MIT, Stanford, Duke, University of Pennsylvania, Caltech.
Section index of 275 refers to Section A of Class 1980;
276 refers to Section B of Class 1980, etc.
Share of Top Schools by Section
I show in ﬁgure (1.1) a scatter plot of zj for every section and class. Simple examination reveals that
11percentage of top schools represented in earlier classes (1950-1960) are slightly more disperse across section
but otherwise there is no distinguishable time trend. An OLS regression of percentage of top schools
on section-class index variable (low index for older classes) conﬁrms this description with a coefﬁcient
effectively equal to 0. Additionally, if one superimposes IPO rates from 1975 to 2011 on the chart with
percentage of top schools represented in each section-class, no noticeable correlation (0.0563) can be
detected. This suggests that zj of past section-class is unlikely to be meaningfully correlated with a future
section experience or any sorting by future students. Moreover, HBS administrators actively intervene
through the balancing process so that no section carries any college-speciﬁc reputation, i.e., ’Section I for
the Ivy-leaguers’, etc. Finally, I include graduating class-year dummies as controls in Xit as a measure for
the types of HBS executives in a VC ﬁrm to partial-out any unobservable class-trends.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 HBS Section Network
In elaborating the unique institution of section assignment at HBS, [15] provides the following description
and anecdotal evidence:
"The B-school [HBS] is the only school in the world I know of that practices the section system to such
an extreme. A few other schools use it but for more limited periods. Its [section’s] impact is greater than
any person’s or group’s... it drives B-school students to learn, inﬂuencing them in countless ways... Yet here
is a uniquely American invention of great potential that is affecting our fortunes in economic competition...
He [a ﬁrst-year student] was saying that much of what he learned at the B-school depended on the section,
and therefore it behooved him to pay close attention to his relationships with the others." (Inside Harvard
Business School: Strategies and Lessons of America’s Leading School of Business, pages 15 - 17)
Philip Broughton, who was a member of section A of class of 2006 reveals his experience with learning
about a section-mate:
"During my time at HBS, I often ran into Bob, my ﬁrst-semester section neighbor. All my early fears
about him had dissolved. Behind the glacial Air Force exterior was a warm, funny man with an elegant
mind and a keen ambition to do the best for his family." (Ahead of the Curve: Two Years at Harvard Business
School, page 209)
As a simple demonstration in showing the effect of section network visibly in the social lives of
graduates, I consider a sample of Class of 1993 VCs that married another HBS alum. In the entire sample
12Table 1.1: HBS class of 1993 VC couples
Firm Name Section Position College Spouse Information
Class Section College
F1 ANON1 B Senior Vice President Wellesley 1990 I Brown
F2 ANON2 C Managing Director Middlebury 1993 D Brown
F3 ANON3 C President Oklahoma State 1993 D Georgetown
F4 ANON4 D Managing Partner McGill 1993 B Harvard
F5 ANON5 D Managing Director Ohio State 1993 D UNC-CH
F6 ANON6 E Managing Director UPenn 1995 F UPenn
F7 ANON7 H Venture Partner Dartmouth 1997 A Dartmouth
F8 ANON8 H General Partner UPenn 1993 F Stanford
F9 ANON9 I Managing Director Kansas 1993 I Harvard
Note: The broader within-HBS coupling ratio is 6%. Among HBS VCs, the ratio is 10%; among class of 1993 VCs, 22.5%. Of the 9
pairs in class of 1993 venture capitalists, 6 are within the same class and 2 are within the same section.
of all graduates, approximately 6% are married to another HBS alum. Among the sample of 40 Class of
1993 VCs (Table 1.1), 9 (22.5%) executives are married to another HBS alumnus. Of the 9, 6 are married to a
spouse who graduated from the same class. Of the 6, 2 are married to a spouse who graduated from the
same section in the same class. In the absence of any section effect on the social interaction of graduates,
one would expect a proportional ﬁgure between 0 and 1 executive married to a section-peer spouse, but the
anecdotal evidence provides an observation that easily suggests section-class proximity as a meaningful
measure of the underlying social interactions among HBS VCs.11 In the marriage market, effect of face
to face meetings and cohort interactions are compelling determinants on outcome, but it remains to be
shown that similar effects can be both identiﬁed and measured with meaningful economic magnitudes
when extended to venture capital fund performance.
1.4.2 HBS Alumni Database
Harvard Business School boasts a growing network of 44,906 MBA graduates. An alumni database
maintained by HBS administrators includes names of students from the very early Class of 1915 to the
most recent Class of 2012. In the Class of 2011, there were 941 students in total: 62 or 6.6% claimed to start
a business, 25% pursued consulting, 39% pursued ﬁnancial services (1% corporate ﬁnance, 7% investment
banking, 11% investment management/hedge fund, 14% VC/private equity/LBO, and 6% other ﬁnancial
services).12
11Similar statistics can be shown for different classes, and also using more inclusive samples with non-VCs.
12http://www.hbs.edu/recruiting/mba/data-and-statistics/employment-statistics.html
13Every HBS graduate was merged with executive names available in Thomson-Reuter’s VentureXpert to
be identiﬁed as either a venture capitalist or an entrepreneur. Each individual’s last, ﬁrst and middle name
was used in that order of signiﬁcance in the ﬁrst stage of the matching algorithm to populate candidate
executive name matches. Titles such as ’Lt. Col.’, ’Dr.’, ’Prof.’ or ’Rear Admiral’ and any sufﬁxes were
dropped in both sides, Thomson and HBS database, for uniformity. For names with common variations
such as ’Dave’ for ’David’, a Levenshtein distance tolerance of 2 characters conditional on last name and
ﬁrst two letters of ﬁrst name match were used. Names with more than three words (’Gonzalo Jose Temes
Castrillon’ or ’Jose Maria Arturo Tan Castillo’) only the ﬁrst and last words were used for matching.
Relatively relaxed matching criteria for long names unlikely yielded much error in the data as two- and
three-word names accounted for approximately 85% of all names.
In the second stage, a set of candidate ﬁrm matches were generated using ﬁrm names. Again, ﬁrm
names were simpliﬁed using a common ﬁltering process of excluding preﬁxes and sufﬁxes appearing in
the following list: pty, pte, plc, llp, llc, lc, lp, inc, l.p., ltd, the. A secondary list was generated matching on
the ﬁrst two words of a ﬁrm name, then individually examined to append veriﬁed pairs to the primary list
of ﬁrm name matches (e.g. Bain Capital Ventures and Bain Capital are often used interchangeably).
In the third stage, by combining the lists generated in both ﬁrst and second stages, pairs of ﬁrm-and-
executive linkages were formed for each HBS alumnus. A row with only a ﬁrm name meant that some
HBS executive was found to be associated with an identiﬁed venture capital ﬁrm or a start-up listed in
Thomson, though his name is missing under Thomson; a row with only an executive name meant that
an HBS executive was found to be associated with an identiﬁed venture capital ﬁrm or a start-up listed
in Thomson, though his ﬁrm association is missing under HBS database; a complete pair meant that the
ﬁrm-and-executive linkage was veriﬁed in both databases. The incomplete pairs can result if an executive
discontinued his/her tenure and moved onto a different ﬁrm while HBS alumni database failed to keep
such records; or if an executive left venture capital/entrepreneurship altogether and Thomson no longer
retains historical executive afﬁliations; or simply the algorithm failed to properly match an individual.
Both partially and fully paired candidates from the third stage were then veriﬁed using major web
sources (executive biography on the company homepage, CapitalIQ, Bloomberg and LinkedIn) and the
Pratt’s Guide to Venture Capital for complete identiﬁcation (e.g. James D. Robinson III, class of 1961C and
James D. Robinson IV, class of 1992E are father-and-son founder and general partner, respectively, of RRE
Ventures LLC) and to populate employment tenure, paying close attention to employment exits and entries.
The median tenure of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are 11 and 13 years, respectively.
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15Of the 44,906 alumni, 2,542 were identiﬁed to be venture capitalists (VC) and 1,033 to be entrepreneurs
(EP) that started a VC/PE-backed company (Table 1.2).13 When restricting the VC data sample to partners,
managing directors, C-level executives and co-founders of funds, 1,742 remain. Titles held by entrepreneurs
included CEO, founder/co-founder, CFO, COO and member of the board. As expected, a large portion of
entrepreneurs were also venture capitalists, either through ﬁnancing rounds and being a board member or
through role transitions (successful entrepreneurs who became venture capitalists) - 733 of the entrepreneurs
either simultaneously or in sequence were also venture capitalists. Although such numbers appear relatively
large (5% VCs including non-partners) or small (3% entrepreneurs) given the initial career destinations
reported by the Class of 2011, it is worth noting that many who initially enter private equity/LBO,
investment banking/management or consulting often switch into venture capital; and not everyone who
starts a company successfully receive VC/PE sponsorship.
1.4.3 Balanced Sections
Since 1949, HBS began dividing all entering MBA students into sections of approximately 90 students each:
A, B, C, D, E, F, G. Sections H, I and J were added in the later years14. According to HBS sources,
"Students quickly discover that the section experience gets them fully engaged during their ﬁrst year at
HBS and beyond, helping to forge lasting friendships and invaluable contacts for life. In effect, the section
becomes a safe and intimate haven where, under the encouragement of mutual support, students can apply
newly acquired skills and leadership abilities. It’s one of the most formative and deﬁning experiences at
HBS."15
Prior to section assignments, the administrators survey each student on his/her background information
(pre-MBA career, undergraduate institution attended, hometown, etc) to uniformly distribute the class
across sections conditional on all observable characteristics. The redistribution effort effectively reduces
the variance of observable characteristics by ensuring that students with certain industry experience or
undergraduate degree are not ex-post clustered in one particular section. As a result, the estimated errors
of regressor coefﬁcients will be larger than the ones derived from section assignments in the absence of
administrative interventions.
13A few inactive/retired, possibly deceased alumni are included in the summary table. However the subsample of identiﬁed
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists for whom the employment data was populated were veriﬁed to be active during their tenure.
14Section H, I and J were each added in 1970, 1971 and 1971, respectively.
15http://www.hbs.edu/mba/academics/sectionexperience.html
16Table 1.3: Distribution of HBS MBA graduates by section and class
Sections Classes
A (4,840) After 2000 (11,692)
B (4,919) 1990 - 2000 (8,215)
C (4,862) 1980 - 1989 (7,642)
D (4,848) 1970 - 1979 (7,252)
E (4,820) 1960 - 1969 (5,391)
F (4,839) 1950 - 1959 (3,245)
G (4,549) 1940 - 1949 (1,184)
H (3,613) 1925 - 1939 (253)
I (3,498) Before 1925 (32)
J (1,710)
K (811)
M (47)
Missing (1,550)
Total MBA 44,906
Table (1.3) displays the distribution of classes from pre-1925 to post-2000 revealing a steady growth of
MBA students over the past 100 years. Distribution across sections A to G is well-balanced in raw number
of students as expected; sections H, I and J have graduated fewer students due to their additions in the
later years.16
1.4.4 Thomson-Reuter VentureXpert and Investment Rounds
Thomson-Reuter VentureXpert lists 5,139 US-based venture ﬁrms, or early-stage investors of private equity
between 1960 and 2011.17 These ﬁrms have collectively raised 10,667 funds and contain 26,029 executives
(including non-investment professionals). Venture ﬁrms have been exposed to 134,870 investment rounds
on 52,233 unique portfolio companies. Distribution of cross-sectional sectoral exposure on the deals is
given in Table (1.4). More than 50% of the rounds are syndicated with at least one other co-investor, or an
average number of 1.61 co-investors per round. I employ the following deﬁnitions in linking a subset of the
data sample to HBS alumni network:
Deﬁnition 1.4.1 HBS GP: VC ﬁrm with at least one HBS executive
Deﬁnition 1.4.2 Section-peer VC (EP, GP): Venture capital executive (entrepreneur, ﬁrm) from the same section and
16Introduction of sections H, I and J in the later years do not pose a problem in the analysis because the oldest executive in the
sample is from class of 1971, year in which all ten sections were present.
17Angel investors and small inactive funds (missing all exposed deal data) are excluded from the sample.
17Table 1.4: Distribution of sector exposure by portfolio company and investment round
Companies Investment Rounds
Sector Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Biotechnology 2,987 5.72 10,480 7.77
Communications and Media 5,353 10.25 15,672 11.62
Computer Hardware 5,336 10.22 14,848 11.01
Computer Software 12,099 23.16 37,663 27.93
Consumer Related 4,340 8.31 8,105 6.01
Energy Related 372 0.71 1,152 0.85
Industrial Products 3,581 6.86 7,228 5.36
Internet Speciﬁc 6,158 11.79 12,190 9.04
Medical/Health 4,897 9.38 15,570 11.54
Other Products 4,817 9.22 6,450 4.78
Other Services and Manufacturing 2,293 4.39 5,512 4.09
Total 52,233 100.00 134,870 100.00
Note: Deals are from 1960 to 2011 invested by US-based early-stage funds.
graduating class
Deﬁnition 1.4.3 Class-peer VC: Venture capital executive from the same graduating class
Deﬁnition 1.4.4 Close class-peer VC: Venture capital executive from the graduating class one year above or below
Table (1.2) shows that each HBS VC executive has an average of 4.16 section-peer executives present at
any given year in which he/she is active, 40.02 class-peer executive. The average tenure (total number of
years active) as a venture capitalist among HBS executives is 15.13 years. The table also reveals that within
a section, executives do not cluster into the same ﬁrm but moderately so within a class; on average, there
are 5.10 and 38.78 VC ﬁrms per section and class, respectively.
Moreover, 12.7% of all VC ﬁrms is an HBS ﬁrm and these ﬁrms have raised proportionately more funds
with 2,276. There are 2.78 HBS executives present per HBS ﬁrm per year; 9.88 HBS section-peer ﬁrms per
year and 65.99 class-peer ﬁrms per year.
On the deal side, table (1.5) shows an interesting pattern: the share of portfolio companies eventually
going public or being acquired is 10.78% when considering the entire sample, 14.49% when the deal is
syndicated by at least one pair of HBS ﬁrms, 16.38% when syndicated by at least one pair of class-peer ﬁrms,
and 18.36% when syndicated by at least one pair of section-peer ﬁrms.18 Additionally, the raw number
of deals syndicated between section-peer venture capital ﬁrms is 452, or approximately a quarter of 1,758
18Firm-level aggregation of individual connections can produce upward-biased estimate of a social-tie. However, change in
syndication coefﬁcient estimate with respect to change in social proximity controlling for the number of HBS execs in the ﬁrm (hence
also the ﬁrm’s number of partners), I am able to rule out non-HBS connection induced bias as a driving effect.
18T
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19Figure 1.2: Normalized section- and class-peer syndication ratios for ﬁrm 2485 05101520251985199019952000 YearSection-Peer RatioClass-Peer Ratio
Normalized syndication peer ratio in year t is equal to
the ratio of share of exposed investment rounds in year t syndicated with a section-peer GP
to share of active firms in year t that are section-peer GPs.
Fund Vintage Year: 1990
Syndication Ratios of Firm 2485
deals syndicated between class-peers. The proportion is even higher in venture capitalist-to-entrepreneur
ﬁnancing matches, in which section-peer matches account for all 100% of class-peer matches. This is clearly
an over-representation given ten sections in each class (or seven sections for older classes), suggesting a
higher propensity to remain socially exclusive in syndications and ﬁnancing.
1.4.5 Deal Flow and Syndication Measures
Deﬁnition 1.4.5 Normalized Section/Class-Peer Syndication Ratio (t) =
Share of investment rounds in year t syndicated with a peer GP
Share of active ﬁrms in year t that are peer GPs
(1.8)
The normalized section-peer syndication ratio measures a ﬁrm’s propensity to syndicate with a section-
peer ﬁrm. It should equal 1, conditional on any possible sorting on ability (i.e. private information relevant
to performance) in the absence of any preference given toward a socially proximate investing ﬁrm. In Figure
(1.2), Firm 2485’s investment activity through its inaugural fund (size: $77.8M) raised in 1990 focusing on
Computer Software across 8 years reveal the signiﬁcantly higher propensity to syndicate with a section-peer
20Table 1.6: Normalized syndication peer ratios
N Mean s
2,525 9.83 60.20
2,525 5.47 14.13
Difference 2,525 4.35 50.44
t-statistic 4.34
Degrees of Freedom 2,524
p-value 0.0000
Note: Ratio of share of exposed investment rounds syndi-
cated with a section-peer GP to share of active ﬁrms that are
section-peer GPs over 2,525 (year x ﬁrm) observations of HBS
venture capital ﬁrms from 1980 to 2011.
ﬁrm than the propensity to syndicate with a class-peer ﬁrm. Since sections are randomly assigned to balance
any private information relevant to ability, it is unlikely that the normalized section-peer syndication ratio
is biased upward by ability measures in comparison to the normalized class-peer syndication ratio. In fact,
this dominance in propensity is generalizable to all HBS ﬁrms as shown in Table (1.6).
Deﬁnition 1.4.6 Leading ﬁrm j: Firm j is the leading ﬁrm on an investment round if it is either an identiﬁed leading
investor in the round, or the highest cumulative equity investor in the portfolio company as of the round19
Deﬁnition 1.4.7 Degrees of VC j in year t: # of unique syndication partners of ﬁrm j in all investment rounds over
a 5-year trailing window ending in year t20
Deﬁnition 1.4.8 Outdegrees of VC j in year t: # of unique syndication partners invited by ﬁrm j over a 5-year
trailing window ending in year t (ﬁrm j is the leading ﬁrm)
Deﬁnition 1.4.9 Indegrees of VC j in year t: # of unique syndication leaders that invited ﬁrm j over a 5-year trailing
window ending in year t
Deﬁnition 1.4.10 Active ﬁrm in year t: VC ﬁrm involved in at least one equity investment round of a portfolio
company in year t
1.4.6 Measures of Performance
I deﬁne performance of funds as the share of invested companies that exit via initial public offerings as of
December 2011. This is a popular measure employed in previous works ([22, 29]). A more inclusive measure
19Thomson-reuter follows similar convention (highest cumulative equity investor in the portfolio company) to identify the lead
investor in the round; its identiﬁcation is usually helpful in deciding between two equally high cumulative equity investors.
20Results are robust to 1-, 3-, 7- year trailing windows, generally yielding stronger relationships with shorter trails
21that also allows exits via mergers and acquisitions yield similar results in most speciﬁcations. Under ideal
circumstances, cash ﬂow data for each fund would allow a computation of capital-weighted measures
such as IRR or TVPI, which can also be used to estimate economic implication of the effects. However,
the usual trade-off faced by empirical researchers in venture capital has been between ﬁrm characteristic
depths and cross-sectional breadths of information ([6, 18, 36]). While Thomson-Reuter VentureXpert is
rich cross-sectionally with reasonably detailed fund-level information, ﬁrm valuation data in both pre- and
post- rounds are missing for over 70% of investment rounds. These limitations yield noisy estimates of
capital-weighted measures due to hidden values of exposed shares and are made worse by share dilutions
from issuance of new shares, through a series of follow-on rounds. However, fund sizes are used to yield
meaningful measures for economic implications.
Another potential point of objection is the selectivity of the deals shown in the database. It is certainly
possible that many failed ventures are excluded and hence performance as measured by share of IPO
exits may be biased upward. But in the context of comparing performance effects between section and
class-peers, it is unlikely that equity values or likelihood to IPO would be systematically different given the
balanced section assumptions. Also, if exit multiples are directly correlated with access (potentially due to
improved production function or access to better deals) in addition to its correlation to IPO exit rates, then
the performance measures limited to IPO exits would be underestimating the effects of social proximity in
both syndication and ﬁnancing networks to VC success.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Inaugural Fund
Initial Deal Flow
The data sample consists of a panel of ﬁrst-time funds raised by 3,538 ﬁrms between 1980 and 2011 that I
follow for 10 years or up to December 2011, whichever is earlier. I estimate ﬁxed-effects panel regression
models under the assumption that disturbances are ﬁrst-order autoregressive, to allow for persistence over
time in a VC ﬁrm’s network position. I use the Baltagi-Wu ([4]) algorithm to allow for unbalanced panels.
Estimates in Table (1.7) reveal that section-peer VC ﬁrms contribute to ﬁrm deal ﬂow in all three measures.
The average percentage of section-peers belonging to a ﬁrm with an active fund targetting the same
22T
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23sector is 1.39% with a standard deviation of 1.61%.21 The results show that an HBS-ﬁrm with one standard
deviation higher percentage of section-peer ﬁrms with an active fund targetting the same sector syndicates
with approximately 3 more ﬁrms; invited to syndicate by 1 more ﬁrm; and lead 2 more ﬁrms in an
investment round. The difference in the number of unique ﬁrms associated with the three different
measures of syndication network reﬂects the fact that degree measures any connection established between
two ﬁrms, indegree measures exactly one leading ﬁrm per round, and outdegree measures all co-investors
in a syndicate excluding the leading ﬁrm.22
Figure (1.2) provides an example of an inaugural fund raised in 1990 with a focus on Computer Software
and a normalized section peer syndication ratio of at least 2 and mean of 11.61 across its 10-year life. A
ratio greater than 1 indicates an excess propensity to syndicate with a peer-ﬁrm, beyond its porportional
representation in the set of all available ﬁrms. Moreover, the section-peer syndication ratio remains greater
than its class-peer syndication ratio consistently, each year through the entire life-cycle of the fund. This
rules out the possibility that syndication patterns are driven by ability-based sorting. Table (1.6) generalizes
the result across all HBS-ﬁrms with mean normalized section- and class-peer syndication ratios of 9.83 and
5.47, respectively. Using a two-sided unpaired t-test, I can reject the null hypothesis that two ratios are
equal with 99.99% certainty.
Section-peer ﬁrms, ceteris paribus, appear to syndicate more often among themselves. There are
many reasons why this may be true. Peer preference can be derived from an existence of utility gained
from friendship that allows for a greater penalty imposition in sustaining the dynamics of an enduring
professional relationship. In an environment of emphatic adverse selection and uncertainty of investment
quality, cost of information acquisition may be lower given an underlying sustainability of collaboration.
Socially-bound syndications may also be used to collude to attain better terms with the entrepreneur.
But what is the mechanism driving the results of outdegree? How is it that a ﬁrm is able to lead on
more deals if it knows section-peer venture capital ﬁrms? One possibility is that the social network gives a
ﬁrm the ability to create a rich syndicate for entrepreneurs, which is attractive for both broader and less
costly access to resource. Indeed, Table (1.7) shows that the share of deals ﬁnancing HBS- executive run
companies are positively associated with the percent of section-peer venture capital ﬁrms with the same
industrial focus.
When considering the deal side, section-peer entrepreneurs successful in attaining venture ﬁnancing
21A fund is deﬁned to be focusing on a particular sector if the majority of its capital is exposed to the sector.
22There are approximately 3 co-investors per round in HBS syndicated deals.
24Table 1.8: Initial deal ﬂow from peer entrepreneurs using 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Degree Degree Indegree Indegree Outdegree Outdegree
% of section-peer EPs 67.54 8.255 24.34
(31.79) (5.972) (8.297)
% of class-peer EPs 59.77 8.955 24.44
(24.61) (4.480) (6.362)
Degree_1 0.623 0.627
(0.0276) (0.0278)
Indegree_1 0.871 0.873
(0.0107) (0.0111)
Outdegree_1 0.886 0.888
(0.00833) (0.00837)
# of HBS execs -0.635 -0.403 -0.148 -0.0214 -0.180 -0.129
(0.818) (0.236) (0.188) (0.0457) (0.270) (0.0693)
Log of total equity invested 1.844 1.866 0.249 0.256 0.422 0.433
(0.195) (0.208) (0.0613) (0.0667) (0.0354) (0.0366)
Log of active ﬁrms 6.113 6.028 0.518 0.495 0.275 0.263
(0.321) (0.329) (0.0660) (0.0722) (0.0578) (0.0574)
Log of new ﬁrms -18.76 -19.39 -4.874 -5.218 -4.740 -4.919
(4.793) (4.842) (1.261) (1.283) (1.670) (1.684)
IPO count 2.426 2.393 0.373 0.367 0.375 0.371
(0.264) (0.272) (0.0451) (0.0460) (0.0572) (0.0571)
MA count 1.891 1.883 0.332 0.334 0.300 0.299
(0.135) (0.142) (0.0320) (0.0358) (0.0216) (0.0220)
Clustering by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class-year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 268.77 1271.37 261.61 1207.31 261.28 1207.24
N 24,249 24,249 21,082 21,082 21,082 21,082
R2 0.845 0.843 0.944 0.943 0.919 0.918
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.001
25Table 1.9: Funds and partnerships, 1960 - 2011
All Funds HBS Funds
General Partnerships 5,139 654
Funds 10,667 2,276
Average Fund size $67.65M $99.75M
(220.82M) (240.99M)
Executives 26,029 1,742
Vintage Years 1960 - 2011 1960 - 2011
Avg. HBS-GP Execs/Year 2.78
(4.31)
Avg. HBS-Section-Peer-GP/Year 9.88
(14.13)
Avg. HBS-Class-Peer-GP/Year 65.99
(66.43)
Note: Firm-level peer statistics are also summarized. Standard deviations are in
parentheses. Source: Thomson-Reuter VentureXpert.
(not necessarily with successful exits) yield signiﬁcant and positive effect in endowing a VC ﬁrm with
an initial deal ﬂow. I am able to rule out potential section-level shocks to identify and measure a causal
effect. Distribution of top undergraduate institutions is used to instrument the share of section-peers that
eventually become portfolio company executives. Table (1.8) shows the estimated effects are signiﬁcant
in both degree and out-degree. One standard deviation higher share of section-peers actively seeking
ﬁnancing appears to endow an HBS venture capital ﬁrm to lead 1 additional company and syndicate with
1 additional ﬁrm.
Fund Size
The conditional average of percentage of section-peers who are actively seeking venture-ﬁnancing in the
vintage year of an HBS-ﬁrm’s inaugural fund, is 2.02% with a standard deviation of 1.73% (Table 1.9). Then,
given the regression estimates in Table (1.10), an HBS-ﬁrm with one standard deviation higher percentage
of active section-peer entrepreneurs raises 6.59%-19.81% (13.20%) larger inaugural fund. Similarly, an
HBS-ﬁrm with one standard deviation higher percentage of section-peer VC ﬁrms raises 9.45%-26.63%
(18.04%) larger inaugural fund.23 When considering the corresponding two-stage least squares estimation
in Table (1.11), I observe that estimations increase to 31.81%-61.43% (46.62%) and 19.71%-36.22% (27.97%),
respectively.
In economic terms, the estimates translate to $56.32M and $33.79M (Table 1.9) or $21.09M per peer
23Standard deviations are in parentheses.
26Table 1.10: Size of ﬁrst fund using OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of fund size Log of fund size Log of fund size Log of fund size
% of section-peer VCs 7.577
(3.610)
% of class-peer VCs 8.581
(3.672)
% of section-peer EPs 7.629
(3.815)
% of class-peer EPs 16.29
(4.086)
# of HBS execs 0.193 0.219 0.0980 0.234
(0.292) (0.279) (0.220) (0.239)
Log of total funds 0.622 0.620 0.623 0.625
(0.0966) (0.0972) (0.0967) (0.0969)
Log of new ﬁrms 2.288 2.516 2.075 2.418
(0.968) (0.983) (1.042) (0.993)
Clustering by Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class-year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2460 2460 2460 2460
R2 0.453 0.452 0.452 0.452
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.001
27Table 1.11: Size of ﬁrst fund using 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of fund size Log of fund size Log of fund size Log of fund size
% of section-peer VCs 11.75
(3.474)
% of class-peer VCs 11.62
(3.894)
% of section-peer EPs 26.95
(8.557)
% of class-peer EPs 22.21
(7.232)
# of HBS execs 0.314 0.306 0.416 0.329
(0.266) (0.275) (0.337) (0.281)
Log of total funds 0.620 0.619 0.619 0.625
(0.0932) (0.0939) (0.0943) (0.0937)
Log of new ﬁrms 0.634 0.635 0.648 0.636
(0.0392) (0.0413) (0.0348) (0.0319)
Clustering by Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class-year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 223.05 1680.72 67.52 194.85
N 2460 2460 2460 2460
R2 0.452 0.452 0.448 0.452
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.001
28Table 1.12: Size of ﬁrst fund with interactions for managerial experience using OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of fund size Log of fund size Log of fund size Log of fund size
A * % of section-peer VCs 1.258
(0.502)
A * % of class-peer VCs 2.648
(1.005)
A * % of section-peer EPs 1.837
(0.710)
A * % of class-peer EPs 5.081
(1.531)
# of HBS execs 0.110 0.128 0.111 0.119
(0.0435) (0.0478) (0.0424) (0.0442)
Log of total funds 0.0741 0.0660 0.0891 0.176
(0.104) (0.107) (0.110) (0.120)
Log of new ﬁrms 0.334 0.317 0.331 0.267
(0.114) (0.117) (0.112) (0.103)
Clustering by Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class-year FE? No No No No
Year FE? No No No No
N 320 320 320 320
R2 0.138 0.136 0.140 0.156
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.001
Note: A is equal to the difference between the vintageyear of the fund and the average number of class-years of the HBS partners.
company and $7.43M per peer VC-ﬁrm, given the average fund size of HBS-ﬁrms. In comparison, per peer
company premium is close in magnitude to the effect of raising a second fund as estimated by Kaplan and
Schoar (2005).
In order to test the idea that fund partners are able to raise larger funds by advertising their social-ties
to limited partners, an OLS speciﬁcation with a proxy for maturity of social contacts is used. If a class of
1995 graduate is raising his inaugural fund in 2000, his contacts (section and class mates) have unlikely had
a sufﬁciently long runway to establish inﬂuential reputation. Thus I interact percent of section/class-peer
VCs and section/class-peer EPs on the difference between the average graduating class years of all partners
in an HBS ﬁrm and the vintageyear of its inaugural fund.
Table (1.12) shows indeed that all four coefﬁcient estimates (section/class-peer VCs and section/class-
peer EPs) are positive and signiﬁcant, supporting the idea of raising larger funds using more established
contacts.
29Selection Bias
Of the 3,799 inaugural funds raised between 1980 and 2007 approximately third of the funds do not report
fund size. Moreover, funds without size are also missing data on sector, type and stage. To ensure that
estimates are not biased upward on a selective sub-sample of funds with disclosed data, I ﬁrst consider an
incomplete OLS speciﬁcation without sector, type and stage ﬁxed effects. The resulting coefﬁcient estimates
of percent of section-peer EPs and class-peer EPs increase slightly to 8.80 and 17.68 with greater than
95% and 99% probabilistic signiﬁcance, respectively. The minor change in estimates suggest that the three
missing ﬁxed effects do not yield a substantially different results between the two sub-samples.
Second, I consider a corresponding tobit regression over all 3,799 inaugural funds, censoring the
1,339 funds with missing data. Estimates of percent of section-peer EPs and class-peer EPs then increase
signiﬁcantly to 32.76 and 89.43, retaining the same probabilistic signiﬁcance, respectively.24 Beta estimates
in tobit models measure both the change in the observed fund size weighed by the probability of observing
the value, and the change in the probability of observing the value weighed by the mean observed fund
size. Thus the increase in estimates suggest that change in likelihood of observing fund size associated
with higher percent of peer EPs dominate the diminished direct effect on size when considering the entire
sample. This exercise shows that if selection bias in size disclosure yield signiﬁcantly different results, the
selective estimates are likely to be biased downward.
Performance
Using Baltagi-Wu (1999) algorithm for unbalanced panels, I estimate ﬁxed-effects panel regression models
under the assumption that the disturbances are ﬁrst-order autoregressive, to allow for persistence over
time in a VC ﬁrm’s performance. The sample consists of a panel of ﬁrst-time funds by 2,510 VC ﬁrms
raised between 1980 and 2007 that are followed for 10 years or up to December 2011, whichever is earlier.
Lagged ﬁrm performance does not yield any signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimate due to its absorption in ﬁrm
ﬁxed effect. Peer performance refers to share of deals that exited via IPO invested by peer ﬁrms before ﬁrm
inception, conditional on peers having invested in at least one deal.
Table (1.13) shows that if section-peer ﬁrms choose to invest in deals in the past and have performed
sufﬁciently well, there is a signiﬁcantly positive factor correlated with the ﬁrm’s performance in its inaugural
fund. The results cannot be used to ascertain a more rigorously identiﬁed causal effect as the preceding
24Results on percent peer venture capitalists are similar in both incomplete OLS speciﬁcations and tobit models.
30Table 1.13: Fund performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Performance Performance Performance Performance
Section-peer invested? -0.0438
(0.0314)
Section-peer performance 0.126
(0.0329)
Class-peer invested? -0.0597
(0.0237)
Class-peer performance 0.107
(0.0304)
Close class-peer invested? -0.0541
(0.0206)
Close class-peer performance 0.0925
(0.0266)
Random-peer invested? -0.00916
(0.00745)
Random-peer performance 0.0439
(0.0113)
# HBS execs -0.0114 -0.0107 -0.0115 -0.0105
(0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130)
Log of total funds -0.0695 -0.0679 -0.0689 -0.0697
(0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163)
Log of total equity invested -0.0587 -0.0588 -0.0588 -0.0594
(0.00542) (0.00542) (0.00541) (0.00541)
Log of new ﬁrms 0.0392 0.0397 0.0395 0.0390
(0.00405) (0.00405) (0.00405) (0.00406)
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class-year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 17677 17677 17677 17677
R2
o 0.0126 0.0124 0.0119 0.0115
rar 0.404 0.404 0.404 0.405
Durbin-Watson 1.365 1.363 1.364 1.361
Baltagi-Wu LBI 1.872 1.871 1.872 1.869
Correlation -0.401 -0.398 -0.407 -0.408
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.001
31results on deal ﬂow and fund size. But the results show a systemmatically weaker coefﬁcient estimates
from section-peer ﬁrms to a randomly chosen ﬁrm that was active in the past. Coefﬁcient estimates range
from 0.0439 for a randomly chosen ﬁrm to 0.126 for section-peer ﬁrms. This means that one standard
deviation higher section-peer performance in the past leads to 6.3% higher likelihood of IPO to 20.79%
from its baseline performance of 14.49%, on deals exposed by HBS-ﬁrms through their inaugural funds.
The dummy term for whether or not a peer ﬁrm was active in the past is negative, albeit insigniﬁcant,
suggests a performance hurdle, conditional on being active, at which peer performance has a net-zero
effect on the ﬁrm. Coefﬁcient estimate on the dummy ranges from -0.009 to -0.044. If peer ﬁrms’ deal ﬂow
improves following strong performance, it seems sensible that the quality of deals also degrades following
failures. Table (1.14) shows evidence supporting deal quality changes, where quality of a deal is deﬁned as
the average number total funds raised by all co-investors on the deal as of 2011. In the following section
for extensions, I also employ the average number of startups founded by c-level executives of portfolio
companies as an alternative measure and show similar results.
1.5.2 Peer Syndication Effects
In previous results, I have shown that social connections lead to more deals, more syndication partners and
to raising larger funds and improved performance. I now examine the underlying investment production
process to distinguish between two competing hypotheses: do social connections reduce cost of search and
coordination such that the production function is enhanced among peers, or do peers have access to the
best deals?
Table (1.5) shows an interesting pattern: the share of portfolio companies eventually going public or
being acquired is 10.78% when considering the entire sample, 14.49% when the deal is syndicated by at least
one pair of HBS ﬁrms, 16.38% when syndicated by at least one pair of class-peer ﬁrms, and 18.36% when
syndicated by at least one pair of section-peer ﬁrms.25 Additionally, the raw number of deals syndicated
between section-peer venture capital ﬁrms is 452, or approximately a quarter of 1,758 deals syndicated
between class-peers. The proportion is even higher in venture capitalist-to-entrepreneur ﬁnancing patterns,
in which section-peer matches account for all 100% of class-peer matches. This is an over-representation
given ten sections in each class, suggesting a higher propensity to remain socially exclusive in syndications
and ﬁnancing.
25Firm-level aggregation of individual connections can produce upward-biased estimate of a social-tie. However, change in
syndication coefﬁcient estimate with respect to change in social proximity controlling for the number of HBS execs in the ﬁrm (hence
32Table 1.14: Deal level quality OLS regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quality Quality Quality Quality
Section-peer succeeded 0.417
(0.0589)
Section-peer failed -0.190
(0.0836)
Class-peer succeeded 0.169
(0.176)
Class-peer failed -0.182
(0.231)
Average fund size 0.00573 0.00579 0.00581 0.00581
(0.000278) (0.000279) (0.000279) (0.000279)
Average # of HBS execs 0.146 0.151 0.152 0.152
(0.00836) (0.00835) (0.00832) (0.00832)
Average # of co-investors -0.00234 0.00142 0.00269 0.00264
(0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201)
Corporate PE/Venture Fund -0.409 -0.388 -0.381 -0.381
(0.0562) (0.0560) (0.0561) (0.0561)
Angel/Individuals -0.263 -0.249 -0.250 -0.252
(0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107)
Independent Private Partnership 1.040 1.062 1.070 1.071
(0.0680) (0.0682) (0.0681) (0.0681)
Investment Bank -0.349 -0.333 -0.331 -0.331
(0.0503) (0.0502) (0.0502) (0.0502)
SBIC/Government -0.403 -0.398 -0.398 -0.398
(0.0523) (0.0523) (0.0522) (0.0522)
Endowment/Pension Funds 0.0837 0.102 0.0992 0.101
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108)
Others -0.690 -0.671 -0.671 -0.671
(0.0677) (0.0679) (0.0680) (0.0680)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 19,070 19,070 19,070 19,070
R2 0.163 0.162 0.161 0.161
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.001
33Table 1.15: Deal level performance OLS regression when syndicated with peers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Success Success Success Success
Section-peer syndicated 0.0588
(0.0193)
Class-peer syndicated 0.0393
(0.00979)
School-peer syndicated 0.0343
(0.00615)
College-peer syndicated 0.0122
(0.00475)
Average fund size 0.00000767 0.00000663 -0.00000136 0.00000649
(0.0000147) (0.0000147) (0.0000148) (0.0000147)
Average fund number -0.0123 -0.0123 -0.0112 -0.0123
(0.00461) (0.00461) (0.00461) (0.00461)
Average # of HBS Execs 0.00437 0.00381 0.00324 0.00427
(0.000818) (0.000840) (0.000858) (0.000835)
Average # of co-investors 0.0240 0.0228 0.0199 0.0240
(0.00236) (0.00237) (0.00245) (0.00236)
Corporate PE/Venture Fund -0.00438 -0.00482 -0.00344 -0.00454
(0.00556) (0.00556) (0.00556) (0.00556)
Angel/Individuals -0.0380 -0.0375 -0.0369 -0.0382
(0.00988) (0.00990) (0.00988) (0.00991)
Independent Private Partnership -0.0436 -0.0434 -0.0428 -0.0438
(0.00491) (0.00491) (0.00491) (0.00491)
Investment Bank 0.00274 0.00268 0.00338 0.00256
(0.00584) (0.00584) (0.00584) (0.00584)
SBIC/Government -0.0537 -0.0535 -0.0527 -0.0538
(0.00559) (0.00559) (0.00558) (0.00559)
Endowment/Pension Funds -0.0526 -0.0525 -0.0520 -0.0528
(0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0190)
Others -0.0155 -0.0153 -0.0126 -0.0156
(0.00411) (0.00411) (0.00414) (0.00411)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 35,368 35,368 35,368 35,368
R2 0.0586 0.0588 0.0592 0.0584
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.001
Note: Errors are heteroskedasticity adjusted.
34The generalization of social proximity and IPO likelihood pattern is shown using OLS estimation in
(1.15) including controls for quality, number of coinvestors, HBS executives and rounds. Although this
simple regression analysis offers some interesting observations, it is limited by the absence of afﬁrmative
causal statements regarding peer syndication and investment performance. First, it is unclear whether or
not VC ﬁrms are syndicating on deals because they are friends (a purely social connection) or because
social interaction allows ability screening and the syndicate is clustered by ability. Second, the direction of
causality cannot be known: is the leading member on the best deal offering access to peer ﬁrms or is the
investment production function improved because of peer-proximity?
If ability screening is the primary function of peer interaction during the MBA years, one should
expect to observe section exclusivity to weaken and eventually disappear in the follow-on funds as market
participants will be able to condition on observable past track-records. Regression results in Table (1.15)
however suggest that section exclusivity and the associated marginal effect on likelihood to IPO remain
robust to inclusion of all follow-on funds as of 2011.
Distinguishing between the two possibilities of improvement in production function through reduction
in cost of search/coordination and access to high-quality deals is difﬁcult when using the share of portfolio
companies that eventually go public as performance measure. Production function improvement idea
would suggest that conditional on accessing a deal, venture capitalists add value beyond providing access
to capital through advice and other resources by working more harmoniously with peers. The access
idea would suggest that best friends offer access to the best deals, and that investing into high-quality
entrepreneurs drives the results of high IPO exit rates.
Using the average number of startups founded (unconditional on exit status) by c-level executives and
founders of portfolio companies prior to the ﬁrst investment round a la Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and
Scharfstein (2005), I control for ex-ante deal quality. I regress deal quality on VC-to-EP ﬁnancing matches
and VC-to-VC syndications. Results in Table (1.16) show a systematically increasing positive and signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient estimates with respect to social proximity in connections. This suggests that peers endow venture
capitalists with access to better deals.
Then I also examine deal outcomes at the individual round-level, in order to distinguish between peer
syndications formed simultaneously in a single round, and syndications formed across a sequence of
rounds. Syndications of the latter form render an early investor who is presumably the leader providing
access to the later investor. If the production function improvement hypothesis is correct, then either
also the ﬁrm’s number of partners), I am able to rule out non-HBS connection induced bias as a driving effect.
35Table 1.16: Deal quality OLS regression when ﬁnancing and syndicating with peers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(ep quality) ln(ep quality) ln(ep quality) ln(ep quality) ln(ep quality)
VC-EP Section-peer 0.0390
(0.0202)
VC-EP School-peer 0.0208
(0.00312)
Section-peer syndicated 0.0261
(0.0172)
Class-peer syndicated 0.0266
(0.00986)
School-peer syndicated 0.0470
(0.0106)
Average fund size 0.000160 0.000151 0.000160 0.000159 0.000148
(0.0000314) (0.0000302) (0.0000315) (0.0000312) (0.0000293)
Average fund number -0.0110 -0.0101 -0.0110 -0.0111 -0.00964
(0.00451) (0.00445) (0.00451) (0.00447) (0.00434)
Avg. # of HBS execs 0.00289 0.00215 0.00269 0.00218 0.000751
(0.00120) (0.00117) (0.00118) (0.00117) (0.00108)
Avg. # of co-investors 0.0211 0.0197 0.0207 0.0197 0.0152
(0.00341) (0.00335) (0.00337) (0.00329) (0.00318)
Corporate PE/VC 0.0131 0.0135 0.0133 0.0132 0.0146
(0.00811) (0.00803) (0.00809) (0.00805) (0.00809)
Angel/Individuals -0.00445 -0.00356 -0.00351 -0.00275 -0.00158
(0.0209) (0.0204) (0.0206) (0.0204) (0.0199)
Ind. Private Partnership 0.0297 0.0296 0.0299 0.0304 0.0311
(0.00545) (0.00538) (0.00548) (0.00551) (0.00546)
Investment Bank -0.000421 -0.000151 -0.000206 0.0000351 0.00106
(0.00414) (0.00417) (0.00414) (0.00412) (0.00416)
SBIC/Government -0.00719 -0.00713 -0.00700 -0.00660 -0.00565
(0.00489) (0.00489) (0.00492) (0.00497) (0.00493)
Endowment/Pension -0.0258 -0.0244 -0.0257 -0.0254 -0.0237
(0.0127) (0.0123) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0126)
Others 0.000464 0.00165 0.000539 0.000819 0.00413
(0.00415) (0.00412) (0.00416) (0.00416) (0.00418)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 35397 35397 35397 35397 35397
R2 0.0973 0.100 0.0973 0.0975 0.0990
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.001
Note: Speciﬁcations in columns (1)-(2) are for VC-EP ﬁnancing. Speciﬁcations in columns (3)-(5) are for VC-VC syndications. Errors are
heteroskedasticity adjusted.
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37form of syndication should be both positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with deal success. Results in
Table (1.17) show that simultaneously formed peer syndications are not signiﬁcantly correlated with deal
success. Rather, estimates indicate that following an early section- or class-peer investor is positively and
signiﬁcantly correlated with success. Using this evidence, I conclude that deal access hypothesis is more
likely true. Further details on the analyses are provided in Section VI.
1.5.3 Across Funds
Deal Flow
In the previous section, it was shown that both peer venture capital ﬁrms and entrepreneurs have a
signiﬁcant and positive effect on providing the ﬁrm with excellent deals in its inaugural fund. Before a
ﬁrm’s performance is revealed to the market, it is plausible that socially proximate peers would endow a
ﬁrm with deals given lower search cost and higher propensity to syndicate. Indeed, this effect is identiﬁed
using 2SLS and presumably most ampliﬁed at the ﬁrm’s inception. But as the ﬁrm ages, does the underlying
social network continue to be operative? In the subsequent funds, market players can select on the ﬁrm’s
past track-record and the previous regression exercise on ﬁrst funds can confound the measures with
ability. I approach this problem by examining the number of peers who are not directly involved in
venture capital but potentially relevant to providing deal ﬂow. I subdivide the data into venture ﬁrms
that target26 one of six (computer software & internet, computer hardware, energy, telecommunication,
biotechnology, retail) major sectors and examine number of peers working in the corresponding sector
in non-investment/ﬁnancial roles. Often times, these individuals are part of the company operations or
management or work as consultants.
Columns (1) - (6) of Table (1.18) show estimations with signiﬁcant coefﬁcients in Computer Software
& Internet. Across all three measures of deal ﬂow, the effect of number of section-peers working in the
industry dominates corresponding effects from the number of class-peers. These estimations however fail
to rule out the possibility of section-level common shocks during the peers’ MBA years. For example, a
particular professor of information technology could have indoctrinated a section of students a certain type
of management philosophy that subsequently lead the section to pursue the industry, albeit in different
roles (operations vs. investment). To address this concern, I consider the number of section peers residing
in the same state as the executives of the venture capital ﬁrm. Then I interact this term with the number of
26Fund must deploy more than 50% of its capital to the target sector
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39section peers working in the same sector as a way to provide a source of variation that is likely correlated
with the level of social interaction (availability to meet at conferences, trade shows, networking events,
reunions, etc). Indeed, both degree and indegree regressions in columns (7) and (9) reveal signiﬁcantly
correlated interaction terms. This provides some evidence for the fact that even after the inaugural fund,
venture capitalists continue to receive deal contacts from their social network.
Performance on Fund Size
It has been shown that there exists a prediction of performance using lagged peer-performance when
considering inaugural funds. Does this pattern continue and remain persistent across second, third and
subsequent funds? What are the economic implications of positive peer-performance? I address these
questions by considering the wider panel of all funds raised by 2,955 VC ﬁrms betwen 1980 and 2007
followed for 10 years or up to December 2011, whichever is earlier. I estimate ﬁxed-effects OLS regression
models with speciﬁcations that vary in social proximity: section-peer, class-peer, close class-peer (one class
above and below the graduating year) and a randomly chosen peer ﬁrm with an active contemporaneous
fund. Table (1.19) shows the resulting estimate, revealing positive and signiﬁcant estimates on peer
performance on fund size in diminishing strengths as I vary the social proximity of peers, with vanished
signiﬁcance for random peer ﬁrm performance. A 95% conﬁdence interval estimation on section-peer
ﬁrms exclude the coefﬁcient point estimate of a randomly chosen ﬁrm, suggesting a statistically different
and stronger effect among connected peers. Coefﬁcient estimates range from 0.0450 on performance of
randomly chosen ﬁrms to 0.774 on performance of section-peer ﬁrms. One standard deviation (28.63%)
higher section-peer performance in the previous period leads to an estimated 22.16% increase in fund size,
or $28.48M.
1.6 Extensions
Is it possible to distinguish between production enhancement and deal access hypotheses? Distinguishing
between the two possibilities is difﬁcult when using the share of portfolio companies that eventually go
public as performance measure. Unlike the investment process in public markets, venture capital managers
not only choose to invest into startups, they are also inﬂuential in achieving successful exits. Moreover, a
measure of deal quality deﬁned as the aggregate age of co-investors in the syndicate will be endogenous to
performance, as managers’ ability to raise follow-on funds depends on investment outcome.
40Table 1.19: Fund performance on fund size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of fund size Log of fund size Log of fund size Log of fund size
Section-peer invested? -0.202
(0.136)
Section-peer performance 0.774
(0.238)
Class-peer invested? -0.202
(0.128)
Class-peer performance 0.636
(0.193)
Close class-peer invested? -0.214
(0.111)
Close class-peer performance 0.613
(0.153)
Random-peer invested? 0.0434
(0.0367)
Random-peer performance 0.0450
(0.0576)
# HBS execs -0.0881 -0.0864 -0.0838 -0.0837
(0.0282) (0.0276) (0.0277) (0.0261)
Log of total funds -0.258 -0.254 -0.254 -0.253
(0.0606) (0.0608) (0.0607) (0.0607)
Log of total equity invested 0.540 0.540 0.540 0.540
(0.0234) (0.0235) (0.0234) (0.0234)
Clustering by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class-year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 37755 37755 37755 37755
R2 0.480 0.480 0.480 0.480
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.001
41An alternative measure for deal quality following Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2005) is
the average number of startups founded (unconditional on exit status) by c-level executives and founders
of portfolio companies prior to the ﬁrst investment round. GKLS ﬁnd that serial entrepreneurs, regardless
of the outcome of their previous ventures, will be more likely to succeed than a ﬁrst-time entrepreneur.
This is because serial entrepreneurs appear to learn also from failures.
Using this measure, the analysis is run at the deal level to examine VC-to-EP ﬁnancing matches and
VC-to-VC syndications on the ex-ante quality of deals. Results are available in Table (1.16). Columns
(1) and (2) show that there is nearly 100% increase in the marginal effect of VC-to-EP ﬁnancing matches
among HBS peers on the log of deal quality when the matches are restricted to section-peers.27 A similar
pattern does not emerge among peer syndications (columns 3 to 5), however coefﬁcients for class-peer and
school-peer syndications are positive and signiﬁcant. Together, the results suggest that social-ties endow
venture capitalists with access to better deals.
1.6.1 Round leaders and followers
One approach to further understand the investment process between peers is discriminating syndica-
tion types. I use individual deal-round data that consists of 118,071 deal-rounds for 35,368 portfolio
companies ﬁnanced by US-based venture funds between 1960 and 2011. Each indicator variable for
section/class/school-lead is equal to 1 if a subsequent round for the same company includes a corre-
sponding peer ﬁrm in its investment syndicate. Each indicator variable for section/class/school-follow
is equal to 1 if a previous round includes a corresponding peer ﬁrm. Lastly, each indicator variable for
contemporaneous syndications is equal to 1 if the current round includes a corresponding peer ﬁrm. The
idea is to distinguish between being an early investor versus being a late investor; then examine the effects
separately across various social proximities.
Table (1.17) shows the result of regressing investment success (equal to 1 if exit via IPO, 0 otherwise) on
each early, contemporaneous and late indicator variables and other controls. In addition to investor-type,
year and sector ﬁxed effects, round stage ﬁxed effect is also included. This control allows me to rule out
the possible interpretation that a positive and signiﬁcant effect of being a follower investor on success is
driven by gaining access to selectively matured deals. Results reveal that leading a round as a class-peer or
school-peer ﬁrm is positively and signiﬁcantly related to success. Following into a round as a section-peer
27In this particular dataset, all class-peer matches occurred between section-peers.
42or class-peer ﬁrm is positively and signiﬁcantly related to success. In particular, following a section-peer
leads to twice the marginal effect on success than following a class-peer. Moreover, investing simultaneously
on the rounds for section/class/school-peers is not signiﬁcantly related to success. Together, the data
suggest that peers are not likely improving the investment production process. Rather, most closely-knit
peers beneﬁt from gaining access to deals identiﬁed by their early-investor contacts.
1.7 Conclusion
The mission of this paper has been identifying and measuring effects of deal access in venture capital. I
employed the random section assignment at Harvard Business School to show that being socially connected
in venture capital leads to more deal ﬂow, larger asset under management and better performance in the
inaugural funds of HBS executive-run venture capital ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst set of results are derived from inaugural funds raised between 1980 and 2011 by US-based
venture capital partnerships so that the effects are free from selection on observable past track-record of
funds. I examined regression coefﬁcients on the number of peers (normalized by section or class size)
working as either venture capitalists or entrepreneurs seeking ﬁnancing in the vintage years as the key
estimate of interest. Since this is an ex-post peer outcome (decision to pursue VC or entrepreneurship is
endogenous), I addressed this problem by using ex-ante characteristics of the incoming section-peers as
instruments and showed that estimates are robust to such controls. The results showed that one standard
deviation higher share of section-peers actively seeking ﬁnancing appear to endow an HBS venture capital
ﬁrm to lead 1 additional company and syndicate with 1 additional ﬁrm. In economic terms, the estimates
translate to $56.32M and $33.79M (Table 1.9) uncondtionally per peer company and VC ﬁrm, respectively, or
$21.09M and $7.43M, given the average fund size of HBS-ﬁrms. In comparison, per peer company premium
is close in magnitude to the effect of raising a second fund as estimated by Kaplan and Schoar (2005).
I also showed that the lagged outperformance of section-peer funds (funds lead by a section-peer general
partner) on deals prior to the inaugural fund’s vintage year, has a positive effect on fund performance.
The results showed that one standard deviation higher section-peer performance in the past leads to 6.3%
higher likelihood of IPO to 20.79% from its baseline performance of 14.49% in the absence of peer activity.
In economic terms, one standard deviation (28.63%) higher section-peer performance in the previous period
leads to an estimated 22.16% increase in inaugural fund size, or $28.48M.
In order to provide insights into the mechanism through which social-ties operate, I tested three
43candidate hypotheses. One possible explanation of the effect of social interactions on managerial success is
ability screening. Regression results however suggested that section exclusivity and the associated marginal
effect on likelihood to IPO remains robust to inclusion of all follow-on funds as of 2011, arguing against
ability screening.
Second explanation is that social-ties reduce cost of search and coordination such that the production
function is enhanced among peers. Third hypothesis is that most connected VCs receive privileged deal
ﬂow. Distinguishing between the two possibilities is difﬁcult when using the share of portfolio companies
that eventually go public as performance measure. Production function improvement idea would suggest
that conditional on accessing a deal, venture capitalists add value beyond providing access to capital
through advice and other resources by working more harmoniously with peers. The access idea would
suggest that best friends offer access to the best deals, and that investing into high-quality entrepreneurs
drives the results of high IPO exit rates.
Using the average number of startups founded (unconditional on exit status) by c-level executives and
founders of portfolio companies prior to the ﬁrst investment round, I control for ex-ante deal quality. I
regress deal quality on VC-to-EP ﬁnancing matches and VC-to-VC syndications. Results show a systemati-
cally increasing positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimates with respect to social proximity in connections.
This suggests that peers endow venture capitalists with access to better deals. Peer VCs may be able to
sustain a stronger dynamic relationship that forms a proprietary deal ﬂow. Indeed, I ﬁnd evidence that
leading investment rounds is associated with being invited to future rounds.
Then I took another step by examining deal outcomes at the individual round-level, in order to
distinguish between peer syndications formed simultaneously in a single round, and syndications formed
across a sequence of rounds. Syndications of the latter form render an early investor who is presumably the
leader providing access to the later investor. If the production function improvement hypothesis is correct,
then either form of syndication should be both positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with deal success.
Results however show that simultaneously formed peer syndications are not signiﬁcantly correlated with
deal success. Rather, estimates indicate that following an early section- or class-peer investor is positively
and signiﬁcantly correlated with success. Using this evidence, I conclude that deal access hypothesis is
more likely true.
The second set of results are derived from an inclusive panel data set of 3,799 funds raised between 1980
and 2007, and measure deal ﬂow and performance across 10-year lifecycles. I used data on peers working
in the same sector as the fund’s focus but in non-investment roles varied by residential proximity to tease
44out effects of social connectedness on deal ﬂow.
A large obstacle in venture capital research is limitation in data due to non-mandatory discloure of
information in private markets. This limitation poses interesting challenges to both the researchers and
practitioners. In this paper, I focused on the variation in investment opportunity sets particular to venture
capital, as a function of social-ties. I showed that being socially connected leads to better deal ﬂow, ability to
raise larger funds and investment performance. Results suggest that the well-connected venture capitalist
may be successful by attaining access to great deals. The effect is identiﬁed in the inaugural fund and
appears to be persistent in the follow-on funds.
However, the evidence and analysis presented are suggestive and indirect as rejections of deals or
syndication invitations are unobserved. Future research could beneﬁt from more exhaustive data sources
or an application of structural model estimations.
45Chapter 2
Competing Ad Auctions1
2.1 Introduction
Online ad auctions sell advertising placements on search engines and elsewhere—providing key funding for
a variety of online resources. Advertisers sign up with one or more ad platforms, specify their advertising
preferences (including conditions in which they want their ads to be shown, and how much they are willing
to pay), and receive clicks from interested users.
In this paper, we explore competition among ad platforms that offer search engine advertising services.
Our motivations are several. For one, we want to understand why some advertisers choose to use only
certain ad platforms but not others. After all, if an ad network cannot attract a broad selection of advertisers,
it will be unable to present ads related to users’ requests, and it will also garner substantially lower
revenue. Second, we want to explore competition across auction platforms. Auction competition is a
relatively unexplored topic in the literature. The primary difﬁculty in considering auction competition
is that classic competition models (e.g. Bertrand and Cournot) view competition through the setting of
market price, either directly or via production quantities. But ad auctions set prices through importantly
different mechanisms: strategic interaction among advertisers yields price discovery, while an ad platform
can inﬂuence outcomes through, e.g., setting of reserve prices.
Competition in online ad auctions also differs from models of auction competition examined in the
literature. [31] explores optimal mechanisms for a seller employing a second-price auction with a reserve
1Co-authored with Ben Edelman, Harvard Business School and Itai Ashlagi, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School
of Management
46price in a general context. In contrast, we limit our auction competition to the search engine industry. This
restriction puts useful structure on competition: in order to attract users, an ad platform seeks to reduce
cost of search to users. But reducing the cost of search decreases the number of clicks users perform, thereby
reducing payments from advertisers. Separately, [16] consider competition among auctions occuring at the
level of strategic entry by auctioneers in two segmented markets with differing buyer-to-seller ratios. There,
an auctioneer chooses between entering in a market saturated with buyers by expecting to compete with
many sellers (competition effect) and selling to great magnitudes (scale effect). Applying this framework to
online ad auctions implies that search engines compete by specializing on exclusive sets of keywords with
correspondingly segmented sets of buyers. However, the leading ad platforms do not strategically limit
keywords or even focus on distinctive sets of keywords. Rather, leading ad platforms sell clicks from web
searchers searching for all manner of subjects, and ad platforms sell to a common pool of advertisers and
would-be advertisers.
We model competing ad auctions in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, advertisers choose to enter one
or more ad auctions after considering each search engine’s user base (capacity) and click-through rates
(technology) in light of an exogenous cost of joining each ad auction. Using the symmetric Bayes-Nash
equilibrium, we derive advertisers’ entry strategies that lead to the VCG outcome of the ad auctions. In
the second stage, participating advertisers submit bids in the ad auction(s) they chose to enter, and ad
platforms strategically compete on increasing capacity while preserving an optimal level of technology to
maximize revenue. This follows a model of Cournot-style competition among ad platforms.
Closest to our paper is [24] which studies competition across ad auctions with auction capacities
endogenized by consumer choice. However, they abstract away from the mechanisms that allocate and
price advertising positions. In contrast, our approach is grounded in the unusual mechanisms used in
selling online advertising.
We proceed in ﬁve parts. In Section 2.2, we develop model fundamentals and notation. In Section 2.3,
we model ad auctions with participation costs—offering an initial explanation of why not all advertisers
use all ad platforms, and testing that explanation with available data. In Section 2.4, we analyze competing
ad auctions in light of user preferences over search engines. In Section 2.5 we develop a concept of “joining"
two ad auctions, and we identify conditions where joins increase or reduce advertiser welfare. In Section
2.6, we conclude.
472.2 Ad Auctions: GSP and VCG
In an ad auction, there are advertisers N = f1,..., Ng and K slots for sale. Each advertiser can receive at
most one slot. The positions are sold for a single period of time. Each slot k has an expected click-through
rate ak > 0. The auction has a known capacity C > 0. Thus, if an advertiser wins slot k, the advertiser will
receive Cak clicks in expectation. We assume that a1  a2    aK. Deﬁne ak = 0 for every k > K.
The value per click for advertiser j is vj 2 [0,1]. Advertisers are risk neutral, and the payoff to advertiser j
for winning slot k is Cakvj minus its payments to the ad platform. We also assume that for each advertiser j,
vj is drawn from a commonly known distribution F, and the value of each advertiser is private information.
Each advertiser j is required to submit a bid bj. We denote by b(j) the jth highest bid. Similarly we
denote by g(j) the identity of the jth highest advertiser. In case of ties, the order among those advertisers is
determined randomly.
We consider payments and outcomes under two distinct auction mechanisms. Modern ad platforms
generally use the Generalized Second Price (GSP) structure, wherein an advertiser g(j) receiving position k
pays a total of Cajb(j+1). In the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) ad auction, each advertiser pays its impact on
all others’ social welfare, assuming bids equal values. Hence, under VCG, advertiser g(j) receiving position
k pays a total of pVCG,k = akC å
min(k+1,n)
j=min(K+1,n)(aj 1   aj)b(j). Both GSP and VCG ad auctions allocate the ﬁrst
position to the highest-bidding advertiser, the second position to the second-highest bidder, and so forth.
Bidding truthfully is a dominant strategy for every advertiser in the VCG ad auction. (See [38], [9],
[19].) [14] and [37] show that there exists an equilibrium in the GSP ad auction under complete information
such that the GSP outcome coincides with the outcome of the VCG auction in which each advertiser bids
truthfully. Furthermore, this equilibrium yields the lowest revenue for the seller, so it is in some sense best
for the advertisers. Finally, [8] shows that a reasonable myopic GSP bidding strategy converges to this
equilibrium.
2.3 Ad Auctions with Participation Costs
Consider a GSP ad auction, and suppose there is a cost Z > 0 for each advertiser to participate in the
auction; Z can be interpreted as an advertiser’s transaction cost in submitting its campaign into the
ad platform. Elements of Z include creating an account, setting advertising parameters, monitoring
effectiveness, adjusting bids, and paying bills. Z is not transferred to the auctioneer. Therefore, a high
participation cost, relative to a platform’s capacity, will cause an advertiser to forego use of that platform,
48even if the advertiser would otherwise ﬁnd it proﬁtable to use that platform. For example, if the following
inequality holds
Z
C
> a1v, (2.1)
then an advertiser with value v will never enter the auction since the advertiser would realize negative
utility even if he managed to receive the ﬁrst slot with zero payment.
In this section we show that there exists a unique threshold function that determines whether an
advertiser will participate in a given ad auction. In particular, consider the following two-stage game: In
the ﬁrst stage, each advertiser decides whether to participate in the auction, as a function of the advertiser’s
value v. The value of each advertiser is private information (whether or not the advertiser enters the
auction). In the second stage, all advertisers that decide to participate in the auction submit a bid. The
advertisers who enter face the same conditions as in [14] and [37], and the outcome coincides with the VCG
outcome of the ad auction with these advertisers.2
A strategy for an advertiser j is a function of s : [0,1] ! f0,1g where sj(vj) = 1 means that advertiser j
enters the auction given that its value vj, and sj(vj) = 0 means j does not enter. We employ symmetric Bayes-
Nash equilibrium as our benchmark equilibrium concept when further analyzing advertisers’ strategies.
Denote by U(v,n) the expected utility (before considering entry cost Z) of an advertiser with valuation
v, who decides to participate in the auction given that exactly n other advertisers also participate. For
simplicity, we assume that if an advertiser’s expected utility is 0 (including costs), the advertiser prefers to
enter the auction. Thus if all advertisers use the strategy s, then an advertiser with valuation v will choose
to enter the auction if and only if
En[U(v,n)js]  Z. (2.2)
After advertisers decide whether to enter, a set of advertisers B bid in the auction, and their equilibrium
bids coincide with the GSP equilibrium in [14] and [37].
Theorem 2.3.1 Suppose U(1, N) > Z. Then there exists a unique strategy s which forms a symmetric Bayes-Nash
equilibrium in the two-stage game. In particular there exists a threshold v > 0 such that for each v 2 [0,1],
advertiser j
s
j (v) = 1 (2.3)
if v  v and
s
j (v) = 0 (2.4)
2In [1] the authors do not model participating costs, but rather let advertisers choose a single ad auction to participate in.
49otherwise.
To prove theorem 2.3.1, the following lemma will be useful. The lemma provides two monotonicity
properties: the expected utility for an advertiser who enters the auction is non-increasing in the number of
participants, and is increasing in the advertiser’s value.
Lemma 2.3.2 For any n < N, and any v:
1. U(v,n) > U(v,n + 1).
2. ¶U(v,n)/¶v > 0.
Proof 2.3.3 Let Q(v,n) and P(v,n) denote the expected number of clicks and expected payment for an advertiser
with value v that decides to enter auction l given that there are n   1 other advertisers in the auction. Thus the
expected utility of such an advertiser is
U(v,n) = vQ(v,n)   P(v,n). (2.5)
Note that
Q(v,n) = C å
1kn

n   1
k

ak ˜ F(v)n k[1  ˜ F(v)]k 1. (2.6)
where ˜ F(v) is the probability that a bidder that entered the auction has a valuation lower than v.3
Let Xn be a random variable distributed over fa1,...,aNg such that P(Xn = ak) = (n 1
k )pn k(1  p)k 1 where
p = ˜ F(v), and let Yn  Bin(n   1, p), i.e. P(Yn = k) = (n 1
k )pn k(1  p)k 1. Note that P(Xn = ak) = P(Yn =
k). For every m > 1, deﬁne
m(m,n) = (am   am 1)P(Yn  m   1),
and let m(1,n) = a1P(Yn  0). Observe that Ql(v,n) = CE[Xn] = C åm1 m(m,n) and that m(1,n) = a1.
By our assumption on click-through rates, ak+1   ak  0. Moreover, P(Yn  k) is decreasing in n because more
trials with the same probability of success will lead to more successes. Therefore, for all m > 1, every m(m,n) is
non-increasing in n, implying that Q(v,n) > Q(v,n + 1). Finally, by [30],
U(v,n) =
Z v
0
Q(x,n)dx, (2.7)
implying that U(v,n) > U(v,n + 1).
3We make no assumption on the entry strategy proﬁle, except requiring that it induce a measurable distribution ˜ F.
50The second part follows because the derivative of U(v,n) with respect to v is equal to Q(v,n) by (2.7) and because
¶Q(v,n)/¶v > 0.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1:
Fix the entry strategies of all other advertisers except j. By Lemma 2.3.2, j is better off entering given
some ﬁxed value v, as long as vj  v. Thus, every symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium is characterized by
a threshold value: there exists a v 2 [0,1] such that every advertiser will enter the auction if and only if its
value is at least v.
Fix a symmetric strategy proﬁle that is characterized by a threshold s. To show existence of the
threshold value, deﬁne
G(v) = En[U(v,n)js]   Z.
By Lemma 2.3.2, G(v) is continuous and strictly increasing in v and by assumption. Furthermore,
Gl(0) =  En[P(0,n)js]  Z < 0, and by assumption Gl(1) = En[U(1,n)js] > U(1, N) > Z > 0. Therefore
there exist v such that G(v) = Z. Since Gl(v) is strictly increasing in v, v is unique. 
The preceding proof indicates that the cut-off value v is a function of the platform’s primitives,
Z,C,a1,a2,...,ak which uniquely deﬁne the auction. Comparative statics follow directly:
¶v
¶C
< 0 (2.8)
¶v
¶Z
> 0 (2.9)
¶v
¶ak
< 0 8k. (2.10)
2.3.1 Advertiser Size and Multi-homing
Consider now a set of L > 0 GSP auctions, indexed by l = 1,..., L. Auctions may differ in both click-
through rates and capacity. For simplicity, let participation cost Z > 0 remain ﬁxed, although our results
can easily be extended to consider varying participation costs. We add a subscript l for relevant parameters
of each auction l.
Observe that the symmetric equilibrium in each auction form a symmetric equilibrium in the extended
game in which each advertiser chooses which auction(s) to enter. Furthermore, the argument in the
previous section implies the uniqueness of this equilibrium. In particular, advertisers’ entry decisions are
independent.
Corollary 2.3.4 Let v
1,...,v
L be the cut-off values corresponding to the unique symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria
51Table 2.1: Advertiser size and multi-homing status (source 1)
Normalized Normalized
Impression Advertiser
Count Count
Google only 17.34 1000.00
Yahoo only 26.01 338.65
Microsoft only 80.92 84.21
Google and Yahoo 663.58 209.26
Google and Microsoft 78.03 24.61
Yahoo and Microsoft * *
Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft 1000.00 65.76
Table 2.2: Advertiser size and multi-homing status (source 2)
Proportion Average Average Average
Ranked Rank Reach Page-Views
Google only 0.696 17,428,974 4.19 0.22
Yahoo only 0.735 14,784,742 5.20 0.40
Microsoft only 0.705 15,838,598 4.40 0.41
Goole and Yahoo 0.862 8,305,741 17.11 1.18
Google and Microsoft 0.888 7,234,154 4.70 0.26
Yahoo and Microsoft 0.871 8,325,335 3.07 0.15
Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft 0.940 3,803,684 62.94 5.64
as in Theorem 2.3.1 and let Bl be advertisers entering auction l in this equilibrium. For each v
l ,v
l0 2 V and
Bl,Bl0 2 B, if v
l  v
l0 then Bl  Bl0.
Proof 2.3.5 Pick any v
l and v
l0 in V such that v
l  v
l0. Then any advertiser with value vj  v
l will enter auction
l, hence j 2 Bl. Moreover, by assumption, vj  v
l0 hence j 2 Bl0.
Corollary 2.3.4 offers a testable implication: Large advertisers multi-home because they can spread
participation cost Z across a large volume of ad purchases, whereas small advertisers ﬁnd the participation
costs too large to justify signing up with smaller platforms.
We test these claims with data from multiple services that track and preserve advertising at multiple
ad platforms. We report normalized advertiser sizes based on independent observations by two different
ad monitoring services.4 Based on data from a ﬁrst data collection service, Table 2.1 compares the size
(impression count, normalized with maximum value set to 1,000) of advertisers that use one, two, or all
three of the ad platforms we examine. Based on data from a second service, Table ?? measures the size of
multi-homing and non-multihoming advertisers by other metrics: Proportion of sites achieving an Alexa
4By agreement with our data sources, we do not report their names.
52Figure 2.1: Advertiser reach and multi-homing status (source 2)
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ranking (data avialable only for approximately the 25 million most popular sites on the web), average
rank (bottom-coding unranked sites at a rank of 40 million), as well as average “reach" (number of users
visiting the site) and average page views. 5 Figure 2.1 plots the distribution of reach by multi-homing and
non-multihoming advertisers.
By each metric, these tables are consistent with Corollary 2.3.4 and our model of advertisers’ participation
costs. In particular, the advertisers that purchase ads from all three platforms are strikingly larger than the
5Reach and page-views are reported per thousand users.
Table 2.3: Advertiser presence rank
Presence
Rank
Microsoft only 1
Yahoo only 2
Yahoo and Microsoft 3
Google Only 4
Google and Microsoft 5
Google and Yahoo 6
Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft 7
53Table 2.4: Ordered probit regressions of advertiser presence rank on reach, rank and page views
Reach Rank Page Views
Presence Rank 0.0832 *** -1.01e-08 *** 0.8360 ***
(0.0208) (4.29e-10) (0.2551)
Pseudo R2 20.64 0.0079 0.0002
Model p-value <0.001 <0.001 0.001
Observations 26286 26286 26286
   P < 0.10
   P < 0.05
     P < 0.01
advertisers that purchase ads only from one or two platforms: They buy more ad impressions (Table 2.1) and
are more likely to be ranked by Alexa, achieve a lower average rank (i.e. greater trafﬁc), larger reach, and
more page-views (Table 2.2). Meanwhile, the advertisers who choose to use only Google are the smallest by
far—further conﬁrming that small advertisers tend not to multi-home. Finally, Figure 2.1 conﬁrms that
triply-multihoming advertisers have pointwise larger reach than double-multihoming advertisers which in
turn have pointwise larger reach than single-homing advertisers. We also verify this relationship through
a simple ordered probit regression. First, we rank combinations of search engines to form a presence
rank—reﬂecting, for example, that Google is larger than Yahoo and Microsoft together. See Table 2.3. Then,
we run an ordered probit of each advertiser’s presence rank on its web site rank, reach, and page-views.
See Table 2.4. The coefﬁcients on reach, rank, and page-views are all positive and signiﬁcantly different
from zero.
2.4 Competing Auctions
In this section, we explore the micro-foundation of ad auction competition. Our approach is grounded
in a fundamental tradeoff facing each search engine: On one hand, a search engine must provide high-
quality results to satisfy users’ requirements as quickly as possible. On the other hand, a search engine
will reap greater revenues if it designs its listings to cause users to click more advertisements. Google
early recognized this tradeoff: In their seminal 1998 paper, Google co-founders Brin and Page ﬂagged an
“inherent" incentive for a search engine to reduce the quality of its algorithmic results or otherwise encourage
users to click on advertisements ([33]). The tradeoff remains timely: For example, when launching its new
“Instant” search service, Google touted a savings of 2 to 5 seconds per search. Such time-savings could
beneﬁt users, but some advertisers found that Instant Search reduced clicks on their advertisements ([12]).
Meanwhile, ([13]) points out that for some search terms, advertisements can be distracting or afﬁrmatively
54harmful—providing a further tradeoff between satisfying users and increasing revenue.
We formalize search engines’ response to the quality/revenue tradeoff via a search cost parameter, s. A
greater search cost implies more advertisement clicks and more revenue to the search engine. Conversely, a
search engine with a lower search gives users the “right” links more quickly, yielding fewer advertisement
clicks but increasing user satisfaction and attracting, all else equal, more users.
Following Hotelling’s model of consumers distributed on a circle ([23]), we build a model of consumer
choice over search engines. Through this model, we endogenize a search engine’s user base (capacity), and
we incorporate a search cost parameter to capture the tradeoff between increasing consumer welfare versus
increasing search engine revenue.
2.4.1 Consumer Choice
Suppose consumers are uniformly distributed around a circle with unit circumference. Suppose two search
engines, A and B, occupy diametrically opposite locations on the circle. (The result can be extended to
three or more engines.) A consumer who accesses search engine l 2 fA,Bg receives value dl, less the search
engine’s cost of search, sl. To access search engine l, the consumer incurs a cost td (where d reﬂects the
consumer’s distance from l and t gives a coefﬁcient on distance). Thus, a consumer chooses engine A if the
consumer is located at distance d such that:
dA   sA   td  dB   sB   t(1/2  d). (2.11)
Given a uniform distribution of consumers, the fraction of consumers choosing search engine A is
1
t(Dd   Ds + 1
2t) where Dd = dA   dB. Similarly, the fraction of consumers choosing search engine B
is 1
t(Ds   Dd + 1
2t). As a result, A’s capacity is CA = C
t (Dd   Ds + 1
2t) where C is the total number of
consumers in the market. Thus, search engine A’s user base decreases as search cost increases, but increases
in the value derived from use.
2.4.2 Ad Platform Selection of Search Cost
At the start of the second stage, advertisers have committed to the bidding process, and the number of
entrants, n = jBlj, and the pool of advertisers Bl (with valuations fv1,...,vng) are ﬁxed. Then the revenue
to search engine l is:
Cl(sl)Sn
j=1Sn
k=j(ak,l   ak+1,l)v(k+1)
55which is equivalent to:
Cl(sl)Sn
k=1(ak,l   ak+1,l)kv(k+1).
Since search cost is proportional to the expected number of clicks required to reach the desired
information, any weighted aggregate click-through rate is strictly increasing in sA:
¶Sk2Kwkakl
¶sA > 0 for any
Swk = 1. Moreover, assume that this function is linear, i.e.
¶2Sk2Kwkakl
¶s2
A
= 0.
For tractability, suppose the search engine’s technology is exponential (subsection B.1). Then ak,l = bk
l.
Deﬁne V = å
n
k=1 kv(k+1) and wk = kv(k+1)/V.
Then we can rewrite the revenue as:
Cl(sl)(1  bl)VSn
k=1wkbk
l.
By the linearity assumption, we can parameterize the sum as Sn
k=1wkbk
l = alsl + bl, yielding the
simpliﬁed expression:
Cl(sl)(1  bl)V(alsl + bl).
This revenue function has a unique internal maximum attained by the following ﬁrst order conditions:
sl =
1
1+ al
(Dd +
1
2
t   bl + sl0) (2.12)
sl0 =
1
1+ al0
( Dd +
1
2
t   bl0 + sl). (2.13)
2.4.3 Comparative Statics
We now consider two special cases: two search engines have pointwise equal technologies (al = al0 =
a,bl = bl0 = b), and one search engine pointwise dominates the other (al > al0,bl > bl0).
Pointwise Equality
Consider a search engine that is identical to its competitor (al = al0 = a,bl = bl0 = b) except that it enjoys a
single advantage: a higher value delivered to consumers during search (dl > dl0). Such a search engine
can leverage that strength by raising search cost while retaining higher capacity. The following theorem
formalizes that advantage:
Theorem 2.4.1 In the two-stage game with two auction platforms l and l0 with pointwise identical baseline technolo-
gies, if dl  dl0, then in equilibrium: sl  sl0,Cl  Cl0,Sk2Kwkakl  Sk2Kwkakl0,v
l  v
l0 and Bl  Bl0.
56Proof 2.4.2 The ﬁrst order conditions (2.12) and (2.13) require sl = Dd
2+a +
1
2t b
a and sl0 =  Dd
2+a +
1
2t b
a . The
resulting capacities are:
C
l = C

1
2
+
aDd
t(2+ a)

(2.14)
C
l0 = C

1
2
 
aDd
t(2+ a)

. (2.15)
Thus, capacity, technology and search cost are all monotonic in d; if dj  dl0 then Cl  Cl0, Sk2Kwkakl 
Sk2Kwkakl0 and sl  sl0.
The threshold values and advertiser set relation follow from Corollary 2.3.4.
Pointwise Dominance
Consider a search engine l that enjoys technology superior to its competitor l0: al > al0  0,bl > bl0  0. In
that case, search engine l receives greater market share even though its value to consumers matches its
competitor. In particular, l and l0 pick search costs s such that
Ds =
1
al0 + al + al0al

(al0 + al)Dd + (al0   al)
t
2
  al0bl + albl0

. (2.16)
Suppose Dd = 0. Then Ds < 0 but DC > 0 since al > al0 > al0

t 2bl
t 2bl0

. That is, l sets lower search cost
and enjoys greater market share.
Alternatively, suppose a search engine l enjoys pointwise dominant technology (as in subsection 2.4.3),
but gives consumers less value than its competitor l0. (That is, dl < dl0.) Then l will receive lower market
share (Cl < Cl0) if its technology is not sufﬁciently greater than l0’s. Formally, DC < 0 if and only if
2al0alDd + al < al0

t 2bl
t 2bl0

.
2.5 Joining Auctions
In this section, we establish a concept of “joining" auctions such that their available positions are pooled,
and all advertisers participating in one auction automatically participate in the other. What happens
to advertiser welfare and ad platform revenue if two ad auctions are joined? These questions take on
special relevance in light of the 2009 partnership between Microsoft and Yahoo, as well as a 2008 proposed
partnership between Google and Yahoo (ultimately aborted after antitrust regulators raised concerns).
We begin with several deﬁnitions.
57Deﬁnition 2.5.1 A set of click-through rates has the property of diminishing differences if ak   ak+1  ak+1  
ak+2 for each k  K.
Deﬁnition 2.5.2 Auction l and auction l0 join to form auction ˜ l if auction ˜ l has capacity C˜ l such that
maxfCl,Cl0g  C˜ l  Cl + Cl0 (2.17)
and if auction ˜ l has click-through rate
ak˜ l = maxfakl,akl0g (2.18)
where akl (akl0) is the click-through rate of slot k in auction l (l0).
By taking the capacities of each auction as the size of the set of consumers choosing the engine,
inequality (2.17) bounds C˜ l. Because some consumers use multiple search engines, we allow for overlap of
capacity between two ad platforms—meaning a joined ad platform might have less capacity than the sum
of capacities of its contributors. Furthermore, we assume that no consumer of either engine is lost upon
join.
When auctions join, what click-through rates result? We envision ad platforms choosing the best
components of each contributor, which implies click-through rates given by the stronger of the joining
platforms. Hence the approach in (2.18).
2.5.1 Joining Auctions to Make All Advertisers Better Off
In the following theorem, we provide a condition in which a joined auction offers a sufﬁcient improvement
in capacity and technology to make every advertiser weakly better off ex post.
Theorem 2.5.3 Suppose auctions l and l0 join to form auction ˜ l. Let Cl  Cl0 and akl0  akl for each k  K. Then
every advertiser is weakly better off ex post if:
C˜ l 
Cl0akl0 + Clakl
(N   k)ak+1,l0   (N   k   1)akl
8k  K. (2.19)
Proof 2.5.4 Suppose auction l and i0 join to form ˜ l and, without loss of generality, let n
l  n
l0.
Consider an advertiser who does not receive any position in either auction before the join. Such an advertiser is
ranked in position k > n
l . Because that advertiser already achieves utility of 0, the joined auction ˜ l cannot make it
worse off.
58Consider an advertiser who receives a position in each of the auctions before the join. We introduce new notation to
characterize ex post utility: denote by ul(v,k) the utility of a advertiser with value v who wins position k in auction l.
Under VCG, we have:
ul(v,k) = Caklv   C å
n>jk
(ajl   aj+1,l)v(j+1) (2.20)
where akl = 0 for k  K.
Prior to the join, an advertiser with valuation v who receives positions in both auctions must receive position
k  n
l0 in auction l0, yielding utility ul(v,k) + ul0(v,k).
Using assumption (2.19) we get:
C˜ lak˜ lv   Claklv   Cl0akl0v  C˜ l(N   k)(ak˜ l   ak+1,˜ l)v 
C˜ l å
n
˜ l >jk
(aj˜ l   aj+1,˜ l)v(j+1)  C˜ l å
n
˜ l >jk
(aj˜ l   aj+1,˜ l)v(j+1)   S, (2.21)
where S = Cl0 å(ajl0   aj+1,l0)v(j+1) + Cl å(ajl   aj+1,l)v(j+1).
The last inequality (2.21) implies:
C˜ lak˜ lv   C˜ lå(aj˜ l   aj+1,˜ l)v(j+1) 
Claklv   Clå(ajl   aj+1,l)v(j+1) + Cl0akl0v   Clå(ajl0   aj+1,l0)v(j+1),
which is equivalent to:
u˜ l(v,k)  ul(v,k) + ul0(v,k). (2.22)
Therefore an advertiser receiving a position in both auctions is better off after the join.
Consider an advertiser with valuations v who receives position k in auction l with n
l  k > n
l0. Such an
advertiser will have ex post utility of ul(v,k). Since we have already shown (2.22), such an advertiser, who wins a
single position, is also better off after the join.
The conditions in Theorem 2.5.3 stipulate intuitive requirements for advertisers to gain from a joined ad
auction: the resulting click-through rate and auction capacity must be sufﬁciently improved relative to the
offerings of the ad auctions when separate. First, the auction with fewer advertisers must add value to the
join through a point-wise larger click-through rate. Second, there must be minimal overlap between the two
auctions, so that C˜ l is sufﬁciently larger than both Cl and Cl0. It is necessary for C˜ l to be sufﬁciently large so
that advertisers in auction l (who already face higher prices due to more advertisers in l) gain sufﬁciently
59from joining the two auctions. An example with exponential click-through rates is given in the appendix.
2.5.2 Joining Auctions that Make Some Advertisers Worse Off
In this section we show that it a joined auction can negatively affect overall advertiser welfare. Consider the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.5.5 Auction l is uniformly stronger than auction l0 if and only if Cl  Cl0, and akl  akl0 for each k.
We denote this by Al us Al0.
If one of the auctions is uniformly stronger than the other and if the resulting capacity remains equal to
its original capacity (i.e. the uniformly weaker auction represents a subset of consumers of the stronger
auction), then joining the auctions will make some advertisers weakly worse off. The following theorem
identiﬁes sufﬁcient conditions that make advertisers worse off:
Theorem 2.5.6 Suppose Al us Al0, and auctions l and l0 join in the manner of Deﬁnition 2.5.2. If C˜ l = Cl, then
any advertiser that wins in both auctions is worse off.
Proof 2.5.7 The assumption implies that ak˜ l = akl  akl0 for each k  K and C˜ l = Cl. Then the joined auction
will be identical to auction l, and thus u˜ l(v,k) = ul(v,k) for any v and k. Prior to the join, if an advertiser wins
position k  n
l0 (and thus the advertiser receives a placement in both auctions), then its total pre-merger utility of
ul(v,k) + ul0(v,k) is greater than its post-merger utility u˜ l(v,k).
2.5.3 Joint Auctions with Endogenous Capacity and Technology
We now return to the foundations of consumer choice to more closely model the change in capacities when
joining auctions. Suppose there are three engines l 2 fA,B,Cg positioned on the unit circle with uniformly
distributed consumers. Individually, each engine solves the following optimization:
max
sl
Cl(ˆ s)(1  bl)V(alsl + bl) 8l (2.23)
where ˆ s represents a vector of three search costs. Denote the solution triple as (˜ sA, ˜ sB, ˜ sC).
Without loss of generality, let engines A and B join; the new platform’s technology will be the pointwise
maximum of A and B, and the new platform will retain the sum of the prior capacities. Moreover, consider
a case in which one engine, A, has a technology that pointwise dominates that of engine B (aA > aB and
60Figure 2.2: Joint auctions with endogenous capacity and technology
bA > bB) and CA < CB. The optimization program under a joined platform will be:
max
sA,sB
(CA(ˆ s) + CB(ˆ s))(1  bA)V(aAsA + bA). (2.24)
When A and B join, the joined platform replaces the technology of B with A. Then the marginal
beneﬁt of increasing search cost on engine B is the increase in CA (increase in technology no longer
applies since technology B has been replaced) while the marginal cost is a reduction in CB. By noting that
C   CC(ˆ s) = CA(ˆ s) + CB(ˆ s) and
¶Cl
¶sl0 < 0 8l 6= l0, we can conclude that total capacity will only decrease in
response to increasing sB. Then the solution to the joint maximization becomes s
B = 0  ˜ sB.
On the other hand, the marginal cost of increasing sA is exactly offset by the increase in CB while the
marginal beneﬁt to technology remains. Then the joined platform will increase sA such that s
A  ˜ sA.
What will be the effect on the resulting individual and aggregate capacity and technology? In order to
predict engine C’s best response to the join between A and B, we examine the ﬁrst order condition of (2.23)
for C:
CC(sc,s c) =  
1
aC
¶CC
¶sc
(aCsC + bC). (2.25)
Note that since consumers’ utilities are linear in the cost of search, the partial derivative on the RHS is a
61constant. Point x1 in Figure 2.2 illustrates the equilibrium market share of C prior to join. After the join, A
and B adjust their search costs from ˜ s c to s
 c, effectively reducing C’s market share. Thus, C would ﬁnd it
undesirable to retain the former level of ˜ sC would be too high (point x2), and C best-responds by reducing
its search cost to s
C. At location x3, C’s market share has decreased while the combined market share of A
and B has increased. Therefore
CA(s) + CB(s)  CA(˜ s) + CB(˜ s)  maxfCA(˜ s),CB(˜ s)g.
Thus, both A and B enjoy increased capacity. Moreover, A’s superior technology replaces B’s technology,
so more advertisers will enter B. Similarly, by retaining the same level of technology while increasing
capacity, A attracts more advertisers. Because A and B each attract more advertisers, the expected payment
of advertisers on A and B will increase.
2.6 Conclusion
Increasing search engine concentration makes it important to understand how advertisement auctions
compete. If each buyer were restricted to entering exactly one auction, then auction platforms could
compete on reserve price or on the cost of entry. But in fact advertisers can multi-home, albeit with
additional costs for each ad platform they join. With multi-homing possible, an advertiser enters an ad
auction if the expected beneﬁt to entry outweighs the associated cost, independent of outcomes in other
auctions. Hence traditional considerations of competition on reserve price or entry cost do not apply. We
therefore turn to the supply side of ad auctions: search engines compete on capacity (each user picks only
one search engine) and compete by setting search cost to balance advertisement clicks (auction real estate)
against user utility.
Using the model’s ﬁrst stage equilibrium entry strategies, we ﬁnd empirical evidence for the result
that multi-homing advertisers are associated with greater trafﬁc and larger reach. In the second stage,
comparative statics around consumer choice parameters offer a stylized view of search engine market
conditions: Google has greater market share and (some suggest) superior technology, while Yahoo retains
higher market share than Microsoft despite (some say) inferior technology.
Our approach informs understanding of the advertiser welfare implications of joining auction platforms.
Joining ad platforms can attract substantial regulatory attention: In November 2008, the Department of
Justice planned to ﬁle antitrust charges to stop the proposed Google-Yahoo transaction. Then, in 2009,
62the Department of Justice approved the proposed partnership between Microsoft and Yahoo. At ﬁrst
glance it might seem paradoxical for Microsoft or the Department of Justice to claim that the Google-Yahoo
transaction is undesirable, for advertisers and for the economy as a whole, while the Microsoft-Yahoo
transaction offers net beneﬁts. But our analysis suggests that that conclusion is entirely possible. In
particular, by creating a joined ad platform of larger size than Microsoft or Yahoo alone, the transaction
lets advertisers spread participation costs over a larger purchase—making it worth the while of small to
midsize advertisers to sign up with the joined Microsoft-Yahoo platform.
We view our contribution as threefold. First, whereas standard models of online advertising take
advertisers’ participation as exogenous, we explicitly model an advertiser’s decision to use or ignore a given
ad platform, and we provide empirical support for our model. Second, we offer a model of search cost to
demonstrate competition across platforms, and we provide empirical support for our model. Third, we
analyze the prospect of joining auctions and characterize when such joins do and do not increase welfare.
63Chapter 3
Consumer Search Pattern in Internet
Advertising1
3.1 Introduction
Internet advertising is the fastest and the only growing form of advertising in the industry. Search
advertising generated $25 billion in 2008 from approximately 100 billion searches performed mostly on just
a few dominant search engines. Of the total spending on internet advertising, search advertising accounted
for 47%, display ads 34%, and classiﬁeds 19%. The market is controlled by an oligopolistic regime consisting
of three platforms with the following shares: Google has 60%, Yahoo 18.1%, and Microsoft 11.8%. Given the
interdisciplinary nature of many relevant topics of research in this ﬁeld, much literature has been published
in computer science, operations research, economics and marketing.
A wealth of theoretical research has produced useful results regarding optimality of ad auction designs
for ex-post efﬁciency ([3, 14]) and a general framework for analysis of position auctions ([2, 37]). But
largely due to limited availability of data, speciﬁcally on any one of the three search platforms, there is no
developed empirical literature on consumer search pattern in search advertising using structural analysis.
However, there are recent studies in different contexts: [25] show that the release of a new album increases
sales of old albums, and the increase is substantial and permanent, especially if the new release is a hit.
Authors pursue this explanation by developing and estimating a model of market demand based on a
1I thank Microsoft Research, New England for the generous support on data access and provision. I write on my own behalf, not
at Microsoft’s request or for Microsoft’s beneﬁt. Do not circulate without permission.
64binary consumer learning model. In [11], the author uses observed search intensities from the online book
industry to estimate search cost distributions that allow for asymmetric consumer sampling.
By viewing the search platform as an intermediary in a two-sided market, the platform is a match-
service between advertisers and consumers. On one side of the market, consumers type in a keyword, then
click and review K ads to complete a task while facing a per-period search cost. The dynamics of optimal
search process will be governed by the fact that quality of each ad, as measured by the likelihood a match
occurs, is private information to advertisers and the engine. Additionally, consumers receive signal via a
short text provided by each ad and draws a bernoulli variable each period until a match occurs (task is
completed in a binary sampling). On the other side of the market, N advertisers acquire slot k < K for
a given keyword(s) a la Generalized Second Price ([14]) auction, design appropriate ad text and link to
represent their ads and pay per click.
Using the platform framework, I develop and compute a dynamic model of search in internet advertising.
Micro-level browsing data from Microsoft’s Bing.com (formerly known as Live.com) is used for structural
estimations. The model predicts that users do not click on any ad with weak signals due to accumulating
search cost and monotonicity of the value function. Rational search reveals a cascading pattern: the
user clicks on a sufﬁciently high, highest-signal ad ﬁrst, then moves on to the ad with the next highest
conditionally expected probability of match once his assessment of likelihood of match on the current ad
degrades over time. The user exits when maximum assessment of likelihood of match over all ads is below
a threshold value. This essay provides a novel approach to understanding rational herding behavior when
product quality is only partially unraveled.
There are two guiding assumptions on developing the consumer search model: consumers are epsilon-
small and individual actions are negligible (assuming away collusive behavior) but individuals are rational
and search optimally. Hence I do not impose a game-theoretic environment but employ dynamic pro-
gramming. Then using such model, I use data from Microsoft which include over 20 million micro-search
records on quasi-unique consumer identiﬁer, time/date in which search occurred, keyword used to search,
ads exposed, ads clicked, time spent on the advertiser’s target site and conversion for estimation.
Despite the inordinate magnitude of breadth of data, I face several econometric hurdles. First, I must
ﬁnd an appropriate set of keywords with sufﬁcient variation in ad conﬁgurations over a set of nearly-
homogeneous advertisers. Given such keywords, I must require two further levels of restrictions: the
associated search session must have generated sufﬁcient number of clicks from users and conditional on
a click, dwell times must be available. Due to user privacy protection agreement, Microsoft is limited to
65infer dwell time on an ad by taking the difference between the time when user clicks out and the time
when user returns to any site belong to Microsoft Network. Hence in the estimation procedure, biases in
dwell time measurement must be appropriately adjusted after a careful analysis of possible qualitative
changes in dwell times. Moreover, conversion - a proxy for completion of task - is an inferred measurement
which rely on consumer having viewed a secure web-page (page links that begin with ’https://’) and a
sufﬁciently high dwell time is recorded. Measuring consumer search cost and value of task completion
will be limited to inferring data from aggregate statistics - median household income and average internet
purchase amounts.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides the modeling framework and discussion for ads
under random ordering; section 3 provides description of the data set in greater detail, and proposes
a measure for quality of ads to use as an empirical building block; section 4 gives detail on estimation
technique; and section 5 concludes.
3.2 Consumer Search Pattern: Discrete Time and Random Ordering of
Ads
Due to lack of variations in consumer-level data, I use a model which suppresses consumer heterogeneity
by normalizing individual-level parameters that simpliﬁes the estimation process. This allows for non-
parametric primitive distribution estimations but lacks a robust micro-foundation. 2
Consumers optimize their search to complete a task at a cost c per period and receive a payoff of 1 upon
completion or 0 upon failure. Denote the set of quality of each advertiser as Q = fq1,q2,...,qKg. Each qk is
private information of each advertiser and drawn i.i.d. from Fq. This distribution is common knowledge.
Assume ads are randomly ordered and thus their positions are not correlated with qk. After entering a
query, he views K sponsored links and receives some signal sk from each ad-text associated with every ad.
In each period t, user decides to either exit search, or continue to review ad k. During the review, user
draws a bernoulli variable with latent probability pk(qk) (likelihood of match) drawn i.i.d. from Fp; if it is
true then user converts and terminates session, else he goes on to period t + 1. User employs Bayesian
updating to infer underlying probability of match in each period.
Upon observation of the signal vector s, the consumer forms a set of prior beliefs regarding the
2Segal and Jeziorski 2009 ([32]) uses random effects utility to generalize consumer heterogeneity, but the model depends heavily
on parametric assumptions.
66probability of match, m0
k = E[pjp  sk]8k  K.
Denote x(i) as the ith reverse-order statistic so that x(i) > x(i+1) > ... > x(K). Also deﬁne l(k) as a map
from index k to l(k)th reverse-order statistic and m(i) = k be the map from the ith reverse-order statistic to ad k.
Let v(s, Ht,t) be the expected payoff in a search session with signal s, history of review result Ht at
period t.
In period t  1, if consumer chooses to stay on the destination page, consumer expects to receive
g(sk,ht
k)   c + d(1  g(sk,ht
k))v(s, Ht+1,t + 1) where d is his discount factor for future payoffs and g(sk,ht
k)
is his updated belief of probability of match given history on ad k at t. It is important to note that because
ads are randomly ordered, his experience with ad k does not affect his belief of probability of match on ads
j 6= k. Upon completion of task in period t, his payoff is simply 1  c and the session terminates. Thus the
consumer search bellman equation becomes:
v(s,ht,t) = maxf0, g(sk,ht
k)   c + d(1  g(sk,ht
k))v(s,ht+1,t + 1)g (3.1)
In order to fully characterize equation 3.1, one must ﬁrst understand how g(sk,ht
k) evolves over time.
Intuitively, given a history of outcomes at the end of period t  0, ht,
g(sk,ht
k) = E[pjp  sk,ht] (3.2)
3.2.1 Properties of the Value Function
The following lemma presents a generalized version of updating belief of probability of match on ad k:
Lemma 3.2.1 Suppose ads are randomly ordered. In period t  1, if consumer is viewing ad k, belief regarding the
probability of match on ad k is updated using the following rule:
g(sk,ht
k) =
E[p(1  p)tjsk]
E[(1  p)tjsk]
8t  1 (3.3)
g(sj,ht+1
j ) = g(sj,ht
j) 8j 6= k (3.4)
Proof 3.2.2 To show (3.4), I use the assumption of random ordering of ads: new information revealed under ad k does
not yield any information regarding the quality of of ad j 6= k.
67To show (3.3), I solve for the expression in (3.2) using the model framework: in period t > 1, I know that
user has drawn an independent sequence of t failures. Hence I let ht = fz1
k = ... = zt
kg. Consider the density
˜ f(p) = fpjsk(pjsk). By Bayes’ rule, I get:
˜ f(pjht) =
fh(htjp) ˜ f(p)
fz(z1
k = ... = zt
k = 0)
(3.5)
=
(1  p)t ˜ f(p)
R
(1  p)t ˜ f(p)dp
(3.6)
Note that expression (3.3) is not monotonically non-increasing over t because p(1  p)t is both concave
and convex over the different sub-intervals of [0,1] for different t. In fact, if p is distributed Beta(a, b),
g(sk,ht
k)  g(sk,ht+1
k ) if and only if a  1, hence the distribution must not possess a mode. This parametric
restriction will play an important role in the estimation procedures described in the latter sections.
Lemma 3.2.3 Suppose the value function v(x) = maxf0,x   c + d(1  x)v(y(x))g is continuously differentiable
on [0,1] and c,d < 1 are constants. Also let y0(x) < 0 on [0,1]. Then v(x) is monotonically non-decreasing in
x 2 [0,1].
Proof 3.2.4 Suppose v(x) = 0. Then v(x) is certainly monotonically non-decreasing in x. Now suppose v(x) =
x   c1 + d(1  x)v(y(x)).
Compute the derivative of the value function:
v0(x) = 1  dv(x) + d(1  x)v0(y(x))y0(x) (3.7)
Deﬁne set S = fxjv0(x)  08x 2 [0,1]g. If S = Æ then I am done. Suppose S 6= Æ. Let b = infS.
Claim 3.2.5 b is an element of S.
Suppose b 62 S. Then by deﬁnition of b and continuity of v0, for any e > 0, v0(b+e)  0. But by the intermediate
value theorem (IVT), there exists a value ˜ b 2 (b,b + e) such that v0(b) > v0(˜ b) > v0(b + e). If v0(b + e) = 0 then
I have a contradiction. If v0(b + e) < 0 then I can set ˜ b such that v0(˜ b) = 0 which imply every point in S is bounded
above by ˜ b while ˜ b > b hence I have another contradiction. Hence b 2 S.
Claim 3.2.6 v0(b) = 0
Since b 2 S, v0(b)  0. Suppose v0(b) < 0. Then by taking the IVT, there exists 0 < ˜ b < b such that v0(b) = 0.
But this means that b cannot be the inﬁmum of S hence I have a contradiction.
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Since b is the minimum of set S, any ˜ x < b is not an element of S, hence v0(˜ x) > 0.
Claim 3.2.8 For any x 2 [0,1], y(x) < x
By 3.3 under Lemma 3.2.1, the claim is obviously true.
Now I return to the expression for v0 and evaluate it at b:
v0(b) = 1  dv(b) + d(1  b)v0(y(b))y0(b) = 0 (3.8)
Using the upperbound for v, we know 1  dv(b) > 1  d(1  c) > 0. Also, because I found y is non-decreasing
on the unit interval, y0(b)  0. This means that v0(y(b)) must be negative. Since I have shown that y(b) < b and
b = infS, v0 evaluated at y(b) must be positive. Hence I have a contradiction.
Note that Lemma 3.2.3 can be proven for any y(x) that is monotonically non-decreasing in x. This
allows one to fully analyze the characteristics of consumer’s expected payoff function, v with a generalized
belief-updating method that 1. reduces the quality of match upon failures (monotonically non-increasing
in t) and 2. sets higher probability of match upon update when the prior is also higher (monotonically
non-decreasing in x).
Proposition 3.2.9 In optimal search pattern, consumers click from highest-quality (as measured by likelihood of
match) ad to next highest-quality ad. Thus consumers expect to receive v(s/s(2), Ht,t) after the ith click during a
search session.
Proof 3.2.10 Since a consumer of any type is an expected utility maximizer, the very ﬁrst click he makes must yield
v(s(1), H0,0) (since the value function is monotonically non-decreasing in signal by lemma 3.2.3) and his experience
with ad k does not affect his belief of quality of ads j 6= k. Then conditional on having explored advertiser associated
with the highest signal, s(1), when choosing another ad to view, he must click on the ad with the next highest-quality
ad, following the bellman equation in 3.1.
Lemmas 3.2.1 and 3.2.3 and equation 3.1 describe a decision-making process in which consumers choose
to spend periods in reviewing advertiser k then eventually switch at some threshold maximum period
˜ tk. The value function is initially set to v(s(1), H0,0) = maxk,t v(sk, Ht,t) but begins to decrease after each
period of unsuccessful match as updated probability of success also decreases. Then at ˜ tk, the value function
is set to v(s(2), Htk,tk) and the entire process repeats itself. It is clear that the implicit ’time limit’ placed
69on reviewing each ad is set endogenously by the set of signals, s. Formally, I present this result in the
following proposition:
Proposition 3.2.11 For each ad k  K, consumer never spends more than tk periods to review the ad before switching.
Moreover, each tk is some function of g(sk,h
tk
k ) and g(s(l(k)+1),h
tk
l(k)+1).
Proof 3.2.12 At period tk, the period immediately before switching, consumer’s value function must be such that:
g(s(l(k)+1),h
tk
m(l(k)+1))   c + d(1  g(s(l(k)+1),h
tk
m(l(k)+1)))v(s, Htk+1,tk + 1) 
g(sk,h
tk
k )   c + d(1  g(sk,h
tk
k ))v(s, Htk+1,tk + 1) =
v(s, Htk,tk)
and
v(s, Htk+1,tk + 1) 
g(sk,h
tk+1
k )   c + d(1  g(sk,h
tk+1
k ))v(s, Htk+2,tk + 2)
Now prior to switching, if consumer is viewing ad k, following 3.4 I have g(sl(k)+1,h
tk
m(l(k)+1)) = g(sl(k)+1,h
tk+1
m(l(k)+1)).
Since v is monotonic in sk:
g(sk,h
tk+1
k ) < g(sl(k)+1,h
tk
m(l(k)+1))  g(sk,h
tk
k ) (3.9)
It was shown in 3.2.1 that g is monotonically non-decreasing in sk and non-increasing in t. Hence it remains to
show that for some ˜ t,
g(sk,h
˜ t+1
k ) < g(sl(k)+1,h
˜ t
m(l(k)+1)) (3.10)
Since g(s,t) approaches 0 as t goes to inﬁnity for any s, I know at some sufﬁciently large ˜ t, inequality 3.10 is true.
Using the lemmas and propositions developed, I can exploit the structure of of consumer expected
payoff to formalize an estimation strategy.
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Position % of Clicks Avg. Dwell Time (In Seconds) Avg. Quality
ML-1 11.74% 152.6456 0.71%
ML-2 11.68% 258.9321 4.34%
ML-3 11.04% 178.4019 1.89%
ML-4 10.68% 197.004 0.19%
SB-1 10.98% 190.9281 0.00%
SB-2 10.97% 558.0493 0.05%
SB-3 10.97% 150.4906 0.00%
3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Data Description
Using internal Microsoft search data, I extracted a sample of approximately 40,000 clicks resulting from a
set of keywords in March 2010. There are 500 unique ads (text and link) shown to approximately 10,000
consumers. Each observation identiﬁes the search session, ad, position, time of click, time spent reviewing
the landing page (dwell time) and conversion. A search session is deﬁned as the period in which a user
begins by 1) entering a search query, 2) views K slots of sponsored links, 3) clicks on one of the ads, 4)
reviews the ad destination page, 5) end the session or return to the same search result page and repeat the
process as in 2). Variation in consumer characteristics is rarely available due to specialized proﬁling by the
engine. Amount of transaction, if occurred, is not available. Dwell time is available only when the user
has returned to Bing.com; it is available in approximately 20% of clicks (total: 40,000). A basic summary
statistics is available in Table 3.1.
3.3.2 Observable Primitives: Conversion and Dwell Time
In the empirical analysis, I am interested in the effects of conﬁguration of ad placements on the quality of
user experience. In order to measure quality of ad, I use the sample average of IsConverted which takes
on the value 1 whenever a pixel located on the objective page within the advertiser’s destination website
is reached (such pixel is placed by the advertiser). Else, it is set to 0. The non-parametric kernel density
estimate of quality is shown in Figure 3.1.
Dwell times were separated into 14 partitions, representing intervals of 30 seconds beginning from 0.
Dwell time is the difference in time between the moment a user lands on the destination page and the
moment he returns to Microsoft search (not necessarily the original search result page which prompted the
71Figure 3.1: Estimated density of quality
ad). Hence a fraction of clicks do not record dwell times and such data points are recorded as missing.
To evaluate the relative quality of such missing dwell times, I use a simple regression on each dwell time
interval while controlling for both position and advertiser ﬁxed effects.
Formally:
IsConvertedi = b3 å
j2J
dtij + b2  å
k2K
positionik + b1  å
a2A
1fadidiag + b0 + ei (3.11)
Explanatory variables on the RHS of 3.11 are indicators for dwell times that belong to one of 14 partitions,
set of indicator variables for each position and ad. Result of the regression is shown in Table 3.2. I ﬁnd
that regression coefﬁcient for missing dwell times is within the range of coefﬁcients for dwell times in the
intervals 240-270 and 270 to 300 seconds. This is consistent with the intuition that a missing dwell time will
tend to be drawn from the right tail of the distribution and signals a relatively satiated user.
Of the 400 ads, I take a subsample of 179 that have some recorded dwell times to run a kernel estimation
of ad-speciﬁc dwell times with unsuccessful conversion. I restrict the sample to dwell times with failed
conversion because if a conversion occurred during a review session, true dwell times would be either
72Table 3.2: Position, dwell time and ad ﬁxed effects on conversion
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P > jtj
ML-2 0.019836 0.003323 5.97 0.000
ML-3 -0.1193 0.004612 -25.87 0.000
ML-4 -0.10454 0.004904 -21.32 0.000
SB-1 -0.10302 0.005059 -20.37 0.000
SB-2 -0.10249 0.00517 -19.82 0.000
SB-3 -0.10296 0.005205 -19.78 0.000
30-60 0.002948 0.004004 0.74 0.462
60-90 0.000728 0.004337 0.17 0.867
90-120 -0.0008 0.004411 -0.18 0.856
120-150 0.013577 0.004731 2.87 0.004
150-180 0.00967 0.005045 1.92 0.055
180-210 0.011034 0.005306 2.08 0.038
210-240 0.033486 0.00582 5.75 0.000
240-270 0.021701 0.006559 3.31 0.001
270-300 0.022854 0.006989 3.27 0.001
300-330 0.025148 0.008362 3.01 0.003
330-360 0.036638 0.008051 4.55 0.000
> 360 0.057653 0.003231 17.85 0.000
Missing 0.021868 0.002525 8.66 0.000
cons 0.062412 0.003759 16.6 0.000
missing or will be longer than the recorded value. Estimated distributions for two ads are shown in the
appendix.
Note that the true distribution will be more concave: estimated distributions tend to overestimate
the frequency of low-dwell times and underestimate the frequency of high-dwell times, due to selective
subsampling of data. However, the following section reveals that such bias is irrelevant to the general shape
(modality) of the estimated density of quality, as required by Lemma 3.2.1.
3.4 Model Estimation
Step 1: Estimate Fp
In this section I recover the distribution of a latent variable, pk(qk) non-parametrically using the assumption
on the ad review process in each period.3
The following equality is true:
3An alternative estimation technique is described in the appendix.
73qk = Prob(IsConvertedk = 1)
= 1  Etk[(1  pk(qk))t
k]
= 1 
T
å
t=0
(1  pk(qk))tProb(tk = t)
If I let x = 1  pk(qk), I can generate a sequence of pk that correspond to each observable qk. A unique
(qk, pk) with pk in the unit interval is guaranteed to exist by continuity of the T-degree polynomial and
Intermediate Value Theorem; its uniqueness can be shown by differentiating the expression with respect to
x which is always positive in [0,1]. A kernel estimation of Fp is shown in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Estimated distribution of p
As noted in the dynamics of conditional expected probability of match, I can conﬁrm that the density
actually ﬁts very close to a ﬁtted Beta distribution with a  1 and hence yields the required monotonicity
properties.
74Step 2: Estimate Signals, Q of G
Unlike the procedure used to estimate Fp, parameters of the distribution of signals to consumers, Q is
difﬁcult primarily due to lack of any direct information available to the econometrician. Therefore, I apply
the structural model presented in lemma 3.2.1 on belief updating and proposition 3.2.11 to exploit terminal
dwell times faced by consumers with prior belief of match, m
˜ tk
k in a particular search session to derive
moment conditions and use GMM for estimation.
At time t = 0, consumer’s belief of match on viewing ad k is equal to E[pkjsk]. Then after sufﬁcient
number of periods has passed (in this case, d1/E[pkjsk]e) producing consecutive failures, consumer’s belief
deteriorates to
R E[pkjsk]
0 ydFk(yjsk). I can recursively deﬁne the value of each step in equation 3.1 as:
h(sk,n) =
Z h(sk,n 1)
0
ydFk(yjsk) 8n > 0 (3.12)
h(sk,0) =
Z 1
0
ydFk(yjsk) (3.13)
Then I have mt
k = h(sk,n) t 2 [dh(sk,n   1) 1e,dh(sk,n) 1e) 8n  1.
Now consider a set of search sessions IF (controlling for the set of unique ads shown) in which ad in
position k was clicked ﬁrst and subsequently ad in position k0 was clicked second. Then by proposition
3.2.11, the dwell time ˜ tk on ad k is such that:
m
˜ tk+1
k < m
˜ tk
k0  m
˜ tk
k (3.14)
Equivalently, dwell time will be mapped by some unique ˜ n such that:
h(sk, ˜ n + 1) < h(sk0,0)  h(sk, ˜ n) (3.15)
Yielding, ˜ tk = sup[dh(sk,n   1) 1e,dh(sk,n) 1e) = d 1
h(sk,˜ n)e.
Then by using the observed dwell times, tik 8i 2 IF, I set:
å
i2IF
1
jIFj
tik = Esk,s0
k

1
h(sk, ˜ n(sk,sk0))
jfk

8k (3.16)
Note that given the computed parameters of quality distribution from the previous step, a simulation
based on initial guess of Q will allow one to use the moment for estimation.
75Step 3: Estimate c and d
After using dwell time for paramter estimation, I now turn to the value function as in equation 3.1 and the
observed click-through rate of each ad k to derive a vector of CTR moments to compute search cost and the
discounting factor.
In the dataset, I restrict my attention to search sessions in which ad k is clicked exactly once and it is the
ﬁrst click. Then I set:
Pr(v(m0
k) = z(s,c,d)  c \ sk = max
j2K
sj) = CTRk 8k (3.17)
where z() is a function of vector of signals over each ad, search cost and the discounting factor. This
function can be estimated using the parameters computed in the previous steps. CTRk is the particular
position-adjusted click-through rate computed using clicks in the chosen set of search sessions. Note that I
have (over) identiﬁcation of the parameters as long as k > 1.
Step 4: Computing the Value Function
After I have estimated a distribution of signals, I can draw a signal vector s for K ads from G. Proposition
3.2.11 shows that there is some terminal duration period for a given vector of signals, hence the dynamic
program is non-stationary and ﬁnite-horizon. I also know that if the terminal duration is T, because the
reservation utility of each consumer is normalized to 0, v(s, HT,T) = 0. Attempting to solve for v(s, H0,0)
using backward induction is yet an arduous process because for large T, the specifying every terminal
node over a game of all possible histories, Ht in each t < T is intractably large. In fact, given the estimated
distribution of terminal dwell times in our data set, T is often approximately 1 hour, or 3600 seconds.
The proposed method of computing the value function is to ﬁrst initialize a vector of value function
from t = 1 to t = T periods. Instead of using backward induction, I compute forward using the initial
guess and iterate each time over a convergence criterion. Figure 3.3 shows that for a vector of signals
(1e   4,1e   4), the value function is monotonically decreasing over time, following the convex shape of
g(1e   4,t) as expected. Figure 3.4 is a plot of initial values (t = 1) over a plane of signal vectors. It reveals
a Leontief cross-section reﬂecting the consumer’s click-sequence that is driven by the maximum value over
the vector of signals. What is important to note is that the value function is strictly monotonic in signal at
time t. This means that a low-quality advertiser with a convincing sub-text (high signal) yields expectedly
high value to rational consumers.This equilibrium is sutained by an accumulating search cost incurred
76Figure 3.3: Estimated path of signal over time
by consumers, preventing them from completely unraveling the underlying quality of ads. Additionally,
the search engine assigns higher scores to ads with more clicks, places the low-quality ad at a higher
position, further strengthening misguided signals. This results in a rational herding among consumers, or
a tendency to concentrate on ads based on signals (beliefs). Summary statistics in Table 3.1 reﬂects this:
clicks are distributed monotonically across positions, indicating consumer preference for signals; yet, the
actual underlying quality of ads as proxied by dwell times are not distributed in any systematic order.
3.5 Conclusion
Using a platform framework, I developed and computed a dynamic model of search in internet advertis-
ing. Micro-level browsing data from Microsoft’s Bing.com (formerly known as Live.com) was used for
structural estimations. Given the limitations in data, I suppressed consumer heterogeneity by normaliz-
ing individual-level parameters that simpliﬁed the estimation process. This allowed for non-parametric
primitive distribution estimations but lacked a robust micro-foundation.
The model predicts that users do not click on any ad with weak signals due to accumulating search
77Figure 3.4: Estimated value function over vector of signals
cost and monotonicity of the value function. Rational search reveals a cascading pattern: the user clicks
on a sufﬁciently high, highest-signal ad ﬁrst, then moves on to the ad with the next highest conditionally
expected probability of match once his assessment of likelihood of match on the current ad degrades over
time. The user exits when maximum assessment of likelihood of match over all ads is below a threshold
value.
Results imply that a low-quality advertiser with a convincing sub-text (high signal) yields expectedly
high value to rational consumers.This equilibrium is sutained by an accumulating search cost incurred by
consumers, preventing them from completely unraveling the underlying quality of ads. Additionally, the
search engine assigns higher scores to ads with more clicks, places the low-quality ad at a higher position,
further strengthening misguided signals. This results in a rational herding among consumers, or a tendency
to concentrate on ads based on signals (beliefs).
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A.1 Supplementary Tables and Figures
Figure A.1: Share of HBS class involved in venture capital as ﬁnanciers or entrepreneurs 0246% of Class in VC/EP19401960198020002020 ClassVenture CapitalistsEntrepreneurs
Share of Class in Venture Capital (1950-2011)
81Figure A.2: Range of shares of HBS section attending top colleges 0.1.2.3.4Shares1970198019902000 Class
Max/Min Shares of Section Attending Top Colleges
82Figure A.3: Share of investment rounds of portfolio companies that have gone public as of 2011 0.1.2.3.4IPO Shares19701980199020002010 Year
The figure displays the share of investment rounds
of portfolio companies that eventually go public as of 2011.
IPO Rates: 1975-2011
83Figure A.4: Total number of investment rounds, 1975 - 2011Cumulative Share of Deals 050001000015000Deals19701980199020002010 YearNumber of RoundsCumulative Distribution of Rounds
The figure measures deal activity when considering 
all 142,843 early-stage investment rounds done by
US-based funds as of 2011.
VC Deals: 1975-2011
84Figure A.5: Correlation between IPO rates and percent of section attending top VC/EP-producing schools, 1970 - 2008 0.1.2.3.419701980199020002010 YearIPO% Top Schools
corr. = 0.0563
IPO Rates and % Top Schools
85Table A.1: Initial deal ﬂow from peer entrepreneurs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Degree Degree Indegree Indegree Outdegree Outdegree
% of section-peer EPs 29.41 1.238 12.65
(15.76) (2.905) (4.319)
% of class-peer EPs 32.69 1.424 17.09
(23.90) (4.762) (6.979)
Degree_1 0.623 0.623
(0.0276) (0.0276)
Indegree_1 0.871 0.871
(0.0107) (0.0107)
Outdegree_1 0.886 0.886
(0.00837) (0.00835)
# of HBS execs -1.123 -1.070 -0.235 -0.233 -0.325 -0.263
(0.724) (0.766) (0.161) (0.176) (0.250) (0.256)
Log of total equity invested 1.859 1.863 0.252 0.252 0.426 0.427
(0.196) (0.195) (0.0611) (0.0611) (0.0357) (0.0356)
Log of active ﬁrms 6.098 6.098 0.515 0.515 0.270 0.271
(0.322) (0.322) (0.0665) (0.0663) (0.0578) (0.0577)
IPO count 2.421 2.420 0.372 0.372 0.372 0.372
(0.265) (0.266) (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0573) (0.0573)
MA count 1.889 1.889 0.332 0.332 0.299 0.299
(0.135) (0.135) (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0218) (0.0218)
Clustering by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class-year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 24249 24249 21082 21082 21082 21082
R2 0.845 0.845 0.944 0.944 0.919 0.919
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.001
Note: The sample consists of a panel of ﬁrst-time funds by 3,538 VC ﬁrms raised betwen 1980 and 2011 that are followed for 10
years or up to December 2011, whichever is earlier. I estimate ﬁxed-effects OLS models with network measure lags to allow
for persistence over time in a VC ﬁrm’s network position. Percent of peer EPs measures the share of HBS executives’ sections
actively seeking investments. Degrees of VC j in year t measure the number of unique syndication partners of ﬁrm j in all
investment rounds over a 5-year trailing window ending in year t. Indegrees of VC j in year t measure the number of unique
syndication leaders that invited ﬁrm j over a 5-year trailing window ending in year t. Outdegrees of VC j in year t measure the
number of unique syndication partners invited by ﬁrm j over a 5-year trailing window ending in year t. Active ﬁrm in year t is
a VC ﬁrm involved in at least one equity investment round of a portfolio company in year t. All controls, with the exception of
year dummies, are lagged by one year. Intercepts are not shown. Errors are clustered by ﬁrm/fund.
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B.1 Example with Exponential Click-through Rates
Suppose click-through rates akl = bk
l for each k  K where bl < 1. Note that these exponential click-through
rates obey both monotonic ordering of akl and the diminishing differences property. Following the framework
in Theorem 2.5.3, we set b˜ l = bl0 > bl. Condition (2.19) then becomes:
C˜ l 
Cl0bk
l0 + Clbk
l
(N   k)bk+1
l0   (N   k   1)bk
l0
8k  K.
Simplifying and rearranging:
C˜ l   Cl0   Cl
bk
l
bk
l0
 C˜ l(1  bl0)(N   k). (B.1)
Because bl < bl0, we know:
C˜ l   Cl0   Cl
bl
bl0
 C˜ l   Cl0   Cl
bk
l
bk
l0
and
C˜ l(1  bl0)(N   1)  C˜ l(1  bl0)(N   k).
Thus the generalized restrictions in equation (B.1) become:
C˜ l   Cl0   Cl
bl
bl0
 C˜ l(1  bl0)(N   1) (B.2)
because this condition implies the required restrictions for each k  K.
87By the subadditive property of joined auction ˜ l and equation (B.2):
Cl0 + Cl  C˜ l  C˜ l(1  bl0)(N   1) + Cl0 + Cl
bl
bl0
which requires:
Cl0 + Cl  C˜ l(1  bl0)(N   1) + Cl0 + Cl
bl
bl0
.
Rearranging:
Cl
C˜ l
 (N   1)
1  bl0
1 
bl
bl0
(B.3)
Since Cl  C˜ l and N  2 (so that the RHS of (B.3) is not trivially 0), inequality (B.3) requires:
1 
bl
bl0
> 1  bl0.
Rearranging yields the requirement:
bl0 >
p
bl. (B.4)
Condition (B.4) requires that the auction with superior technology have bl0 sufﬁciently larger than bl.
Furthermore, if N is very large, then bl0 must approach 1 in order to satisfy the requirement in (B.3). Note
that these are necessary conditions, but not sufﬁcient conditions.
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C.1 Alternative Estimation of F
Fk is the distribution of the true, underlying likelihood of match occurring between the consumer and the
product offered via ad k. I use the fraction of clicks that resulted in IsConvertedk = 1 to proxy for the
likelihood of match. Consider the following latent variable model:
Y
k = X0
kbk + ek (C.1)
where ek  N(0,1), Xk is a vector of appropriate regressors (i.e. position dummies) and IsConvertedk
is the indicator variable for Y
k > 0. Then given a sequence of observations, fyik,xikgN
i=1, I estimate the
parameters using maximum-likelihood:
ˆ bk = argmax
bk
N
å
i=1

yiklnF(x0
ikbk) + (1  yik)ln(1  F(x0
ikbk))

8k (C.2)
But since I have a large number of impressions with small variation in regressors, we can also compare
estimated parameters under MLE to Berkson’s minimum chi-square method. Suppose among N observa-
tions fyik,xikgN
i=1 there are only M << N distinct vectors of the regressors. Group all xik into a distinct
set fx1k,...,xMkg. Let rm be the number of observations with xik = xmk and yik = 1 and let nm be the total
number of observations with xik = xmk. I will denote:
89ˆ pm = rm/nm (C.3)
ˆ s2
m =
1
nm
ˆ pm(1  ˆ pm)
f2(F 1( ˆ pm))
(C.4)
Then the generalized least squares estimator with weights ˆ s 2
m regressing F 1( ˆ pm) on xmk is:
ˆ bk =
 
M
å
m=1
ˆ s 2
m xmkx0
mk
! 1 M
å
m=1
ˆ s 2
m xmkF 1( ˆ pm) (C.5)
C.2 Supplementary Tables and Figures
Figure C.1: Estimated dwell time distribution of ad (1)
90Figure C.2: Estimated dwell time distribution of ad (2)
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